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Abstract
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desirability, (ii) socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, (iii) the survey design, and
(iv) the presence of learning effects. We find strong evidence for a social desirability bias in
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1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing availability of survey and administrative micro data has created immense
possibilities for contemporary empirical economics. However, this progress has also raised questions
of data quality and validation in order to ensure the reliability and accuracy of information. In the
literature, the analysis of differences between responses in traditional surveys and administrative
records has been a fruitful method to assess quality of micro data. Particular attention has been paid
to income data since it is essential for a variety of welfare indicators and policy questions. Moreover,
public interest in questions of income distribution has been growing considerably in recent years and
research on income inequality has rapidly gained momentum. The underlying income information
is usually obtained either from household surveys or from administrative records whereby both
data sources have their idiosyncratic merits and drawbacks. While policy recommendations are
frequently based on survey data, the accuracy of survey responses is often questioned and issues of
measurement error are raised. Accordingly, there is still no consensus upon what is the best way to
collect income data at the micro-level (Hansen and Kneale, 2013).
Potential differences between survey responses and administrative records have already been
addressed in the literature on data quality and measurement error (Moore et al., 2000; Lohmann,
2011). The identification of measurement errors requires by definition a point of reference to judge
the accuracy of the information. In validation studies, administrative records are frequently used
as benchmark even though this assumption has also been relaxed to a varying extent in the recent
literature (Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007; Abowd and Stinson, 2013; Bingley and Martinello, 2017).
The choice of the benchmark data reflects the researchers’ confidence in the accuracy of a specific
dataset. We rely on evidence that the quality of Austrian administrative data is very high (Asamer
et al., 2016; Schnetzer et al., 2015; Berka et al., 2012).
This paper focuses on two research questions. What are the reasons for misreporting income in
surveys and do these reasons differ with respect to specific types of income, i.e. wages, pensions, and
unemployment benefits? The causes why survey responses may deviate from administrative records
are manifold (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001; Tourangeau, Rips, et al., 2000; Kapteyn and
Ypma, 2007; Abowd and Stinson, 2013; Paulus, 2015). Specifically, we focus on four error sources
emphasised in the literature. These are (i) the presence of a social desirability bias in survey
responses, (ii) specific socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, and (iii) the survey
design. Finally, we test for (iv) the presence of learning effects in the response behaviour. These
reasons may also vary with respect to the income component. For instance, social desirability may
have different directions for earned income and for unemployment benefits.
The data requirements for an empirical evaluation of these error sources are extensive. Most
previous studies have been forced to combine survey and register records via statistical matching
techniques, based on either register data or error-prone self-reported identifiers, such as social
security numbers. Additionally, consent of individuals to match survey and register data is usually
needed. Since participation in the matched sample often is voluntarily, the sample is biased towards
individuals giving more accurate responses (Bollinger, 1998). Briefly speaking, there is evidence of a
consent bias for matched data sources. Furthermore, samples based on optional matching are often
found to be non-representative for the whole population (Jenkins, Cappellari, et al., 2006; Jenkins,
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Lynn, et al., 2008; Sakshaug and Eckman, 2016; Sakshaug, K Couper, et al., 2012).
Fortunately, the Austrian 2008–2011 waves of the European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) do not suffer from such shortcomings. In this dataset, the survey
responses are linked directly to administrative records by the National Statistical Institute via
unique personal identifiers. Compared to probabilistic methods, this procedure ensures that the
administrative income information is linked exactly to the corresponding survey respondent and
thus reduces matching uncertainty drastically. Hence, our dataset provides both survey and register
income data for the exact same observational units and offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the
drivers of income measurement error.
We thus are able to compare survey and administrative data within one dataset which is a
considerable advantage compared to most existing research. Even the most prominent studies about
income measurement error are based on sophisticated statistical matching procedures of survey and
administrative datasets. Other validation studies are restricted to individuals working at a single
company (Pischke, 1995). The dataset used in this paper is not subject to any of these limitations.
Furthermore, in contrast to papers studying measurement errors in total household income, we are
able to analyse different single income components including unemployment benefits, which has
rarely been done yet.
In summary, we contribute to the literature in multiple ways. We exploit a unique dataset
providing both administrative records and survey responses to analyse differences in income re-
ports. We are able to conduct a comparative analysis of three different income concepts with a
panel structure over the period of four years. Contrary to other studies that are limited to single
companies, our analysis is representative for the whole population. Finally, we apply an Owen value
decomposition to quantitatively assess the importance of four specific reasons for misreporting.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of potential
sources of measurement errors elaborated in the existing literature. In section 3, we discuss the
specifics of our EU-SILC dataset and provide descriptive statistics for the structure of errors in
our data. We then apply a multinomial logit model to evaluate the effects of the above-mentioned
error sources (i) through (iv) in section 4. For a more detailed analysis of error sources (i) and
(iv), we conduct panel regressions to detect changes of response behaviour over time. We conclude
our analysis quantifying the relative importance of the four error sources based on an Owen value
decomposition. Finally, section 5 provides a summary of our results.
2 Reasons for Measurement Error in Survey Income Data
While the use of administrative data in empirical research has rapidly gained momentum (Einav
and Levin, 2014), the accuracy of survey information has increasingly been contested during the
last years (Meyer et al., 2015). Erroneous information can arise from misreporting by respondents
and decrease the overall quality of survey data. Misreporting in surveys is particularly grave when
the affected data is, like income, the basis for policy-making.
Following the psychological literature on cognitive processes when answering a survey question,
misreporting of income can arise from, first, troubles related to the interpretation and understand-
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ing of the question asked, second, problems in retrieving and judging the relevant information
as well as its placement in time and, third, difficulties in formulating a response in the required
format (Tourangeau, Bradburn, et al., 2010). The theoretical and empirical literature on income
measurement errors emphasises four main reasons for misreporting: (i) social desirability, (ii) socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondent, (iii) specifics of the survey design, and (iv) the
presence of learning effects. However, the existing literature has ignored that those four reasons for
misreporting can vary with the income type under consideration.
For instance, Angel et al. (2017) analyse reporting errors for total disposable household income in
Austria, which is not observed directly but aggregated ex-post based on a comprehensive inquiry of
single income components. Misreporting based on total household income thus disregards potential
heterogeneity of the error-generating process between household members and income components.
Further, misreporting of income can go into two directions: respondents can overreport or under-
report a particular income type. In what follows, we discuss how (i) to (iv) can result in over-
or underreporting of wages and then, why (i) to (iv) might lead to different expectations for the
misreporting of pensions and unemployment benefits, the two other income components considered
in this paper.
First, social desirability bias is probably the most important reason for income misreporting in
surveys. Due to the sensitivity of questions about income, social desirability might lead to deliberate
misreporting (Moore et al., 2000). It is widely documented that sensitive questions elicit patterns of
overreporting (underreporting) for socially (un)desirable behaviour, attitudes, and characteristics
(Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001). For wages, the resulting hypothesis is that reported values
are biased towards the mean, hence reporting errors are expected to be mean-reverting. Respondents
at the lower tail of the wage distribution overreport as they feel ashamed of their actual economic
conditions, while respondents at the upper tail of the distribution underreport since they do not
want to disclose their high wages to an (unknown) interviewer. Such a reporting pattern is consistent
with a desire for social comfort in the sense that households tend to locate themselves in the middle
of the distribution. Related micro-level validation studies typically confirm the mean-reverting
nature of the error in reported earnings (Kreiner et al., 2015; Kim and Tamborini, 2014; Pischke,
1995; Bound, Brown, Duncan, et al., 1994; Bound and Krueger, 1991). As an exception, Hariri
and Lassen (2017) find for the Netherlands that respondents at the top of the income distribution
overreport their income. In their study, however, income comprises earnings, employers’ pension
contributions, transfer and capital income, which were collected exclusively via telephone interviews
with a one-shot recall question. These results are thus not easily comparable with most other studies
that focus on earnings and derive income data from surveys with more complex interview modes.
Second, misreporting of income might vary with socio-demographic characteristics of the re-
spondent (Kreiner et al., 2015; Kim and Tamborini, 2014; Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001;
Tamborini and Kim, 2013). We expect to find a higher propensity to overreport wages for males,
due to a desire to demonstrate social status and to comply with the male-breadwinner model. Ex-
isting research suggests different misreporting patterns by sex, where males are found to overreport
earnings more often than females (Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bollinger, 1998; Micklewright and
Schnepf, 2010; Pedace and Bates, 2000; Kim and Tamborini, 2014). Kim and Tamborini (2014)
and Bound, Brown, Duncan, et al. (1994) find that higher educated workers report earnings more
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correctly. Respondents with higher education might display lower rates of misreporting as this group
is potentially more likely to be familiar with the purpose and relevance of households surveys. The
positive correlation between education and financial literacy documented in the literature (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2014) may also explain some of these findings.
The relationship between misreporting and age is a priori unclear. On the one hand, cognitive
abilities to answer the questionnaire decrease with age. On the other hand, older respondents re-
ceive wages for a longer period of time and are in more stable employment. Since the vast majority
of validation studies has found a negative relationship between misreporting and age, we adopt
these findings for the expectations for our Austrian sample (Kim and Tamborini, 2014; Kim and
Tamborini, 2012; Bound and Krueger, 1991). Two additional socio-demographic characteristics po-
tentially contributing to the accuracy of responses are the number of changes in the employment
status during the income reference period, related to receiving income from different sources and
second, the number of months spent in a specific employment status during the reference period.
Changes in the employment status can be associated with telescoping errors, which refer to misplac-
ing the receipt of a particular income source in time. A stable employment status is associated with
less variation in the level of income received. With respect to wages, it is reasonable to assume that
changes in the employment status increase reporting errors while longer employment periods lead
to less misreporting, since it is easier to recall the remuneration. Kim and Tamborini (2014) find
that occupation or industry switchers are more prone to misreport earnings while Bound, Brown,
Duncan, et al. (1994) document a negative relationship between job tenure (years with current
employer) and response error.
What the literature has largely ignored is the relationship between misreporting and health,
the degree of urbanisation, and the country of birth. Healthier individuals may give more accurate
answers because they are in better mental conditions and therefore are less likely to make recall or
response errors. Further, we expect to find less misreporting, the higher the degree of urbanisation
at the respondent’s place of residence is. The rationale of this argument is rooted in the anonymity
of cities, whereas in rural areas, mistrust in unknown interviewers might be more pronounced.
Additionally, misreporting is related to the respondent’s country of birth. Being foreign-born can
serve as an indicator of language skills and familiarity with institutional settings. As both factors
are relevant for the comprehension of the questions and the correct allocation of total income across
income types, we expect to find more misreporting of wages for foreign-born respondents.
Third, and regarding the survey design and setting, a wide range of variables is likely to influence
the response behaviour. We focus on the role of the interview mode (Lynn et al., 2012), the time
span between the income reference period and the interview, and proxy responses. Regarding the
interview mode, telephone interviews are considered to be more susceptible for misreporting of wages
than a face to face setting. Fessler et al. (2017) find that households interviewed via telephone report
higher incomes on average than those interviewed personally. Furthermore, it is crucial whether
the respondent provides the required income information personally or via an entitled third party.
While some studies have found little proxy bias (Bound and Krueger, 1991; Mellow and Sider,
1983), others suggest a downward bias (Tamborini and Kim, 2013; Reynolds and Wenger, 2012).
We expect more misreporting of wages for proxy responses, resulting from a lack of information.
Finally, we hypothesise that the larger the time span between the interview and the income reference
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period, the larger the error in reported wages because of recall and memory problems.
The fourth, and last, central issue with reporting errors is the presence of learning effects. If
present, reporting errors are supposed to attenuate with cumulated survey experience. Learning
effects are related to recall and retrieval strategies of respondents and are best explained in the
context of panel surveys, where the same households are interviewed repeatedly. In the first wave
of participation, respondents are unexperienced regarding the survey setting and unprepared to
answer the questionnaire. In the follow-up waves, however, respondents might be equipped with
income tax documents and other relevant files. Therefore, we expect to find misreporting of wages
to decrease with accumulated survey experience. Likewise, a learning effect can also be expected
for pensions and unemployment benefits.
While some variables might have similar effects on wages, pensions, and unemployment benefits,
we anticipate diverging effects for others. For instance, wages (and pensions) are attached to the la-
bor market and tied to (past) individual effort, whereas unemployment benefits are often stigmatised
as charity despite actually being an insurance. The socially desirable behaviour is thus to downplay
the level received leading to a general underreporting of unemployment benefits. Regarding (ii) the
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, we expect males to underreport unemployment
benefits more often and stronger than females since receiving benefits contrasts the common male
bread-winner model. Being unemployed might be associated with a higher social stigma for the
better educated. Therefore, we expect underreporting (overreporting) of unemployment benefits to
be an increasing (decreasing) function of education. While being foreign-born might lead to a higher
misreporting of wages and pension income, we expect to find less overreporting of unemployment
benefits since those born abroad might be particularly prone to downplay the level of received state
transfers.
With respect to the number of changes in the employment status, some particularities have to
be mentioned. Typically, respondents only retire once and thus might be better informed about
the level of pension they are going to receive. Precisely for this reason, we expect to find less
misreporting of pensions, if the employment status for those receiving pension income has changed
in the reference period. The relationship between the number of months spent in unemployment
and misreporting of unemployment benefits is ambiguous. Short unemployment spells might be
associated with less misreporting since respondents are better informed about the actual transfer
due to the singularity of the situation. On the other hand, respondents might care less about the
level of received unemployment benefits, the shorter the time spent in unemployment.
Table 2 summarises our expectations regarding the direction of the effect of the relevant variables
related to social desirability, socio-demographic characteristics, the survey setting, and the learning
effect, for over- and underreporting wages, pension income and unemployment benefits.
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Table 1: Expected effects of misreporting by survey income types
Wages Pension Unemp. ben.
S<A S>A S<A S>A S<A S>A
(i) Social Desirability
Income Decile (increasing) + − + − + −
(ii) Socio-demographic characteristics
Gender (Ref: Female) − + − + + −
Education (Ref: Compulsory school) − − − − − −
Age (increasing) − − − − − −
Country of birth (Ref: Austria) + + + + + −
Health status (Ref: Very bad) − − − − + +
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10,000 inhabitants) − − − − − −
Changes in employment status (Ref: None) + + − − + +
Months in corresponding emp. status (Ref: 12 months) + + + + ∼ ∼
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI) + + + + + +
Type of interview (Ref: Personal) + + + + + +
Month of interview (Ref: March-May) + + + + + +
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: First) − − − − − −
Notes: This table summarises our expectations about the likelihood to over- and underreport income
conditional on different sources of errors. S<A: Underreporting in Survey; S>A: Overreporting in Survey;
+ stands for an increasing probability to fall in that specific reporting category, − symbols a decreasing
probability, ∼ implies an ambiguous relationship.
3 Data, variables, and method
3.1 Data and variables
For the assessment of income measurement errors in surveys, we make use of the Austrian EU-SILC
(European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). EU-SILC is a rotational household
panel with a quarter of respondents being exchanged each year. The sample is drawn from all
private households with a main residence in Austria according to the central population register.
The main questionnaire is aimed at household members aged 16 or older and is conducted partly
with computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI) and partly with telephone interviews (CATI). In
certain cases, proxy interviews with other household members were carried out instead of personal
interviews (e.g. roughly 11% in 2011).
The primary motivation to utilise Austrian EU-SILC data is a unique feature compared to
other household surveys: for four consecutive years, it provides combined income information from
personal interviews and administrative sources. Up to the year 2011, incomes on both personal and
household levels were obtained via conventional survey interrogation. From 2012 on, income data
gathered from administrative records have replaced survey data for certain components of disposable
household income, like wages, pensions, and unemployment benefits. Fortunately, Statistics Austria
was able to merge administrative income data to the full EU-SILC survey sample from 2011 back
to 2008. The detailed merging process of register and survey data is described further below.
The rotational character of EU-SILC allows to track households for as long as four consecutive
years. With the data at hand, this maximum period of observation applies to the survey cohort that
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first participated in 2008 and remained in the survey until 2011. The 2007 and 2009 cohorts are each
covered in three waves, the 2006 and 2010 cohorts in two waves respectively. In contrast to Eurostat’s
EU-SILC User Database (UDB), the Austrian national SILC provided by Statistics Austria delivers
cross-sectional and longitudinal information in one single database. In this integrated dataset, there
are one cross-sectional and three longitudinal weights for those households in the rotational sample
that have already been interviewed repeatedly. By virtue of permanent household and individual
identifiers, we are able to track the changes in household responses compared to changes in the
administrative records over time. It has to be noted in this respect that, in contrast to the first-
time interrogation, follow-up interviews were predominantly accomplished via telephone (CATI).
Survey income data are collected retrospectively in EU-SILC and correspond to the calendar
year prior to the interview. For income components with unequal net and gross values, respondents
were asked to report either one or both values. When refusing to deliver a precise figure, interviewees
could also report an income bandwidth. In the latter case, the specific income is estimated based on
the empirical distribution of the corresponding income component. In the event of item non-response
for single income categories, missing values are derived partly from socio-economic characteristics
like sex, education, and age in an econometric exercise, and partly from statutory regulations like
collective wage agreements. While the amount of imputations is generally rather low in EU-SILC,
the application of such estimation methods may be an important source of measurement error. For
instance, roughly 0.5% of the records had to be completely imputed in 2011 (Statistics Austria,
2014b). Since we focus on error generating processes in personal survey responses, we exclude
imputed values from the analysis. We thus restrict our study on net income from wages, pension
and unemployment benefits for which both survey responses and administrative data are available
in EU-SILC. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the number of observations, the interview
mode, and the share of imputations for the selected income types.
Table 2: Observations, Interview Mode, Share of Imputations – SILC 2008-2011
Obs. Int. Mode (%) Wages (%) Pensions (%) Unemp. (%)
HH Persons CAPI CATI Svy. Adm. Svy. Adm. Svy. Adm.
2008 5,707 10,946 70.0 30.0 4.6 2.6 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.8
2009 5,878 11,056 57.1 42.9 5.9 1.9 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.8
2010 6,188 11,493 59.6 40.4 4.8 2.4 1.5 0.4 0.3 0.9
2011 6,187 11,475 57.3 42.7 3.4 2.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.1
Notes: Columns 5–10 show the share of imputed values for selected income types. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own
calculations.
Register information for the income types used in our study is obtained from various adminis-
trative sources whereof the most important are the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), the
Wage Tax Register, and the Transfers Dataset by the Public Employment Service Austria (AMS).
We briefly describe these datasets below while a detailed documentation of administrative sources
used in EU-SILC is presented in the data appendix A and in Statistics Austria (2014a). The ASSD
provides the social security status, e.g. whether individuals are employees, pensioners or eligible
for unemployment benefits. The Wage Tax Register contains information on all taxable earnings of
employees and pensioners. This dataset includes wages, public pensions (retirement benefits), paid
maternity leave and sickness benefits. The Transfers Dataset contains the beginning and ending
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date of unemployment spells and the respective benefits on a daily basis.
In Austria, employers have to report wages directly to the tax authorities, retain payroll taxes
and social security contributions, and transfer the residual net income to the employees. Since this
is a standardized electronic procedure and there are regular tax inspections, the data quality is
significantly higher than of self-reported income tax returns. Concerning flaws in administrative
data due to tax avoidance, there is empirical evidence that this is comparatively less of an issue
in Austria than in other OECD countries (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Hassan and Schneider, 2016).
Information on pensions and unemployment benefits are provided straight by public authorities and
correspond with actual payments to the entitled individuals. The probability of measurement errors
in this dataset is very low since reports are effectively linked to payments that are also administrated
by the data holders. All in all, recently carried out quality reports on Austrian register data certify
high confidence in its reliability (Asamer et al., 2016; Statistics Austria, 2014a).
The merging process between survey and administrative data is accomplished reliably with a
branch-specific personal identification number for official statistics (bPIN OS) which serves as a
unique ID in both data sources. These 172-digit PINs were introduced to protect privacy in the
communication among public authorities via e-government. The PINs are created by the Austrian
Data Protection Commission and used to identify individuals in the EU-SILC survey and in the
administrative sources. Unlike previous studies, we thus do not have to fall back on two-sample
matching processes or the like, since survey responses and retrospective administrative information
are already combined for the years 2008 to 2011. Studies on measurement errors usually also
depend on consent to link survey responses to administrative records which often leads to small
sample sizes (Kreuter et al., 2010). In our study, between 95.6% (2008) and 99.4% (2011) of the
respondents in the EU-SILC survey could be identified with a PIN in order to assign the register
information (Statistics Austria, 2014a). The residual population in EU-SILC could not be found in
the administrative sources and thus no PIN was available. These individuals are mainly younger
than 40 years old, non-Austrian citizens, and not registered at their main residence. Another
major advantage of the accurate linkage is that the income reference periods for the survey and
the administrative records overlap exactly and no adjustments to ensure comparability between the
data sources had to be made.
Table 3: Reporting of Income Types – SILC 2008-2011
Wages (%) Pensions (%) Unemp. ben. (%)
Svy. Adm. Diff. Svy. Adm. Diff. Svy. Adm. Diff.
2008 53.8 56.6 -2.8 24.9 24.1 0.8 7.1 10.2 -3.1
2009 54.8 58.0 -3.2 25.0 24.7 0.4 7.4 10.2 -2.8
2010 55.4 57.9 -2.4 25.9 25.3 0.6 9.1 12.6 -3.5
2011 55.8 59.0 -3.2 24.0 24.6 -0.6 9.2 12.7 -3.5
Notes: This table shows the share of respondents reporting a specific income type.
Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
Reporting income is a two-stage process in EU-SILC. At the first stage, respondents have to indi-
cate whether a certain income component was received during the reference period. Only in a second
step, the amount of income received from a particular source has to be reported. Consequently, a
mismatch between survey and register data can result at either stage. Table 3 shows the percentage
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of respondents reporting the three involved income types. Wages are consistently underreported in
the survey data by 2.4 to 3.2 percentage points. By contrast, the number of individuals report-
ing pension income is slightly higher in the survey data compared to the administrative records
with the exception of 2011. The share of survey respondents with declared unemployment benefits
is generally lower than indicated by the official statistics. The deviations range between 2.8 and
3.5 percentage points. Overall, we notice a prevailing underreporting of income receipt in survey
responses with the exception of old-age benefits from 2008 to 2010.
With regard to the level of reported income, we distinguish the following possible cases of
mismatch. Respondents can report a particular source of income in the survey even though it
was not received according to register data (Sx0) or vice versa, not report a particular type of
income even though it was received according to register data (0xA). Further, the survey report can
positively or negatively deviate from the register data, which corresponds to overreporting (S>A)
and underreporting (S<A), respectively. No mismatch occurs if a respondent reports the amount
that corresponds to the register entry within a narrow range of ±5% (S=A) or if a specific type
of income was not received according to both survey and register data (0x0). Since reporting an
amount in the survey that corresponds exactly to the register value is almost impossible, we allow
the survey report to deviate marginally from the register entry in order to fulfil our operational
definition of correct answers. We define a categorical variable Pr(Yi,k = j) for mismatch types j,
individuals i= 1, ...,N, and income component k ∈ [1,3] as
Pr(Yi,k = j) =

Pr(Yi,k = 0x0) if no income in survey and admin
Pr(Yi,k = 0xA) if only admin income report (false negative)
Pr(Yi,k = S<A) if survey underreporter
Pr(Yi,k = S=A) if survey corresponds to admin
Pr(Yi,k = S>A) if survey overreporter
Pr(Yi,k = Sx0) if only survey income report (false positive)
Table 4 gives an overview of the structure of mismatch in Austrian EU-SILC data from 2008 to
2011. In this summary, we display the shares of observations in the respective reporting categories
and the median of the absolute and relative deviation between survey and administrative responses.
For all income types, the shares of over- and underreporters are very stable over the years. There
are roughly 17% overreporters and 23% underreporters for wages which is a high number compared
to only 11 to 13% of respondents with matching values (apart from the 40% with no wage income in
both data sources). The median relative deviation from the administrative information lies around
-17% for underreporters and roughly 26% for overreporters.
Concerning pensions, we see stable shares of reporting types except for 2011 where the percentage
of correct responses takes a sudden jump to roughly 20%. Between 2008 and 2010, the share of
underreporters exceeds the number of overreporters, however, the median deviation is considerably
higher for the latter group. With regard to unemployment benefits, the share of correct survey
answers is very low and consistently smaller than the shares of over- and underreporters. The
median respondents with lower survey than administrative values report approximately 30% less
income. The median relative deviation for overreporters ranges between 34 and 48%.
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Table 4: Structure of mismatch in income reporting – SILC 2008-2011
Wages Pensions Unemp. benefits
Obs. Abs. Rel. Obs. Abs. Rel. Obs. Abs. Rel.
(%) (P50, e ) (P50, %) (%) (P50, e ) (P50, %) (%) (P50, e ) (P50, %)
2008
0x0 40.3 0.0 0.0 73.5 0.0 0.0 88.6 0.0 0.0
0xA 5.9 −1566.2 −100.0 1.6 −4474.5 −100.0 4.3 −1703.1 −100.0
S<A 22.5 −3257.7 −18.1 8.0 −2334.2 −13.5 2.6 −882.4 −32.6
S=A 11.0 −78.7 −0.7 8.8 −110.6 −0.9 0.7 −38.3 −1.4
S>A 17.3 3314.3 27.0 5.6 3474.9 23.8 2.5 1137.4 48.1
Sx0 3.0 8459.3 In f 2.4 10907.1 In f 1.2 4200.0 In f
2009
0x0 39.4 0.0 0.0 73.4 0.0 0.0 88.6 0.0 0.0
0xA 5.8 −1386.2 −100.0 1.6 −4666.3 −100.0 4.0 −1398.7 −100.0
S<A 22.9 −3255.7 −17.8 8.3 −2580.0 −14.4 2.6 −833.8 −29.4
S=A 11.7 −56.7 −0.5 8.9 −81.9 −0.6 0.7 −31.4 −0.7
S>A 17.7 3177.2 25.9 5.9 3046.7 21.9 2.9 908.2 42.5
Sx0 2.6 7420.0 In f 1.9 10904.8 In f 1.2 4200.0 In f
2010
0x0 39.3 0.0 0.0 72.5 0.0 0.0 86.7 0.0 0.0
0xA 5.2 −1368.6 −100.0 1.5 −4860.6 −100.0 4.2 −1802.5 −100.0
S<A 22.9 −3197.6 −16.8 9.1 −2465.8 −13.4 4.0 −1003.7 −32.1
S=A 12.4 −86.1 −0.7 9.0 −114.0 −1.0 1.2 −1.2 0.0
S>A 17.3 3093.5 26.0 5.6 3497.2 25.7 3.2 923.2 34.6
Sx0 2.8 5716.7 In f 2.2 11237.4 In f 0.7 2800.0 In f
2011
0x0 38.5 0.0 0.0 74.2 0.0 0.0 86.6 0.0 0.0
0xA 5.7 −1281.0 −100.0 1.9 −5632.1 −100.0 4.2 −1589.2 −100.0
S<A 22.7 −3083.0 −16.9 1.1 −3455.7 −17.6 3.8 −1020.9 −30.8
S=A 13.3 −121.2 −0.8 20.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 −10.6 −0.5
S>A 17.2 3178.2 26.3 1.0 5249.3 84.9 3.6 1019.9 34.3
Sx0 2.5 4419.5 In f 1.2 11540.6 In f 0.6 5220.0 In f
Notes: This table shows the proportion and the median difference (both in absolute and relative terms) of
reported survey income and the income recorded in administrative sources per income type and survey year.
(1) 0x0: no income in survey and administrative data. (2) 0xA: only income in administrative data. (3) S<A:
reported income is below the value in administrative data (4) S=A: survey income corresponds to
administrative data. (5) S>A: reported income is above the value in administrative data. (6) Sx0: only
income in survey data. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
As we have shown that differences between administrative records and survey responses are
relevant for various income components, we aim to ascribe the occurring mismatches to the above-
mentioned reasons for misreporting. Thus, we are interested in the effect of (i) social desirability,
(ii) socio-demographic characteristics, (iii) aspects of the survey design, and (iv) learning effects on
the presence, direction and extent of misreporting of three components of total disposable household
income (wages, pensions, and unemployment benefits).
In the empirical analysis, we use different approaches to shed light on these issues. When
studying the reasons (i) to (iv) for the direction of misreporting, we distinguish between those
with practically correct information, over-, and underreporters, and consider both the positive
and negative mismatch. In contrast, when analysing the impact of these reasons on the extent of
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misreporting, we focus on the metric difference (survey minus register).
The right hand side in our econometric specification comprises the variables describing reasons (i)
to (iv) for misreporting. The presence of (i) social desirability bias is indicated by the respondent’s
position in the respective income distribution specified by the income decile in the register data. The
explanatory variables referring to (ii) the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent are
gender, educational attainment according to the ISCED classification, age, and a categorical variable
referring to the health status. We also include the country of birth, the degree of urbanisation at
the place of residence, and the employment status with the following options: full-time employed,
part-time employed, full-time entrepreneur, part-time entrepreneur, unemployed, retired, domestic
worker, student or other. Additionally, dummy variables indicating the number of changes in the
employment status during the income reference period should capture the stability of employment.
Finally, depending on the type of income investigated, we include the number of months being either
full- or part-time employed, retired, or unemployed. The distribution of over- and underreporters
across the socio-demographic characteristics is shown in Table B.1.
The explanatory variables related to (iii) the survey setting comprise a dummy variable for the
interview mode (CAPI/CATI), a dummy variable related to the reporting status (proxy vs. self-
reported income), and a categorical variable specifying the month of the interview (March to May,
June to August, September to November). The motivation for the latter variable is straightforward:
the earlier the interview took place, the shorter is the time span between the income reference
period and the income reporting. The distribution of the response categories across the survey
setting variables is given in the lower part of Table B.1. The indicator for (iv) the learning effect
is a dummy variable for the interview wave ranging from one to four. Individuals participating in
more than one waves are a priori expected to have more experience with income surveys and tend
to provide more reliable responses.
3.2 Method
Our empirical strategy is a three-step procedure. First, we apply a multinomial logit regression to
assess the impact of the single reasons on the direction of mismatch and thus the probability to
over- or underreport income. Second, we enrich the analysis with panel regressions to estimate the
effect of the single reasons on the extent of misreporting while controlling for unobserved individual
characteristics. Third, we determine the relative importance of the error sources for misreporting
with an Owen decomposition. In the following, we describe each of the three steps briefly.
Multinomial logit. With a multinomial logit model, we search for factors that help us to better
understand why self-reported incomes are above or below their corresponding administrative records.
Our dependent variable is the mismatch category Pr(Yi,k = j) and we calculate the probabilities for
reporting less (S<A), the same (S=A), or more (S>A) than his or her true income. Although strictly
speaking, respondents who do not report income in both sources (0x0) have no mismatch, this
group of observations is not of interest for our main research questions and therefore discarded from
the analysis. Additionally, due to the very low number of observations without income information
either in the survey (0xA) or in the administrative register (Sx0), we restrict our attention to
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overreporters, underreporters, and the consistent group.1
By estimating a multinomial logit model via maximum likelihood, we explicitly allow the es-
timated coefficients to vary across the mismatch categories. Thereby, we are able to identify the
determinants of mismatch separately for overreporters and underreporters. This is a considerable
advantage compared to OLS regression, since it may be very hard to defend the assumption that
the variables influencing underreporting are similarly affecting the probability of overreporting.
Even more, in the standard OLS framework all reporting errors are pooled together. Consequently,
assuming parameter homogeneity across mismatch categories could not only lead to misleading
interpretations, but positive and negative errors could potentially cancel out and leave us with
statistically insignificant estimates. In contrast, the effect of e.g. gender or education on the proba-
bility of misreporting is allowed to differ between over- and underreporters in the multinomial logit
model. This flexibility enables us to draw a more detailed picture of the factors that influence the
response behaviour of individuals in income surveys.
Panel regression. Although we consider an extensive and diverse set of control variables, we
cannot rule out that our estimation lacks relevant but unobservable determinants. To check the
robustness of our findings, we thus make use of the longitudinal dimension of EU-SILC from 2008 to
2011 and employ fixed-effect estimations. The focus on within-individual changes makes it possible
to control for individual characteristics that are unobserved but supposedly constant over time,
such as the cognitive ability to answer interviews or past experience with surveys. To purge these
unobservable characteristics in two related specifications, we apply panel OLS regression models
with individual and time fixed effects.2The dependent variable is the difference between survey and
administrative records for each person-year.3.
In the first panel specification, our primary interest is the influence of social desirability on the
difference between the survey report and the administrative value. We expect a clear pattern across
income deciles, with a positive mismatch (i.e. overreporting) in the lower parts of the distribution
and a growing negative mismatch (i.e. underreporting) as we approach the top income earners.
In the second panel specification, we are particularly interested in the learning effect where only
the absolute mismatch is relevant. The question is whether individuals participating in multiple
survey waves tend to decrease reporting errors and repeated interrogations are associated with
a statistically significant learning effect over time. The set of explanatory variables resembles the
multinomial models apart from gender and the educational level, which both show negligible within-
variation among adults.
1We provide estimates for linear probability models in table C.1 in the online appendix. For each income type,
three linear probability models were estimated. One for those reporting less (S<A), one for those reporting the same
(S=A) and one for those reporting more (S>A) income in the survey. In each model the dependent variable is a dummy
variable indicating if a certain mismatch type is observed.
2In table B.9 in the online supplementary materials we report the number and the proportion of observations
in our unbalanced panel sample that jumped over a given number of income deciles. For wages we find that 3.348
individuals (37.9 %) experienced a change of at least one decile, in the case of old age benefits 1.174 persons (25.2 %)
and in case of unemployment benefits 491 (76.8 %) units changed at least on decile across the years. We conclude
that the observed variation is sufficient to identify the corresponding coefficients.
3We prefer a linear OLS specification as this provides a clear interpretation of marginal effects on the original
scale. In contrast, for longitudinal (nonlinear) binary and multinomial logit response models with fixed effects, the
intuitive interpretation of estimates as predicted probabilities (or various types of marginal effects) is not a viable
option because the unobserved heterogeneity vector of person fixed effects is not estimated (see e.g. Pforr, 2014 for a
more detailed discussion)
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Owen value decomposition. Finally, we are interested in the relative importance of error
sources (i) to (iv) and apply an Owen value decomposition of the explained variance (R2) in a pooled
cross-sectional regression. This procedure allows to estimate the marginal contribution of each group
of explanatory variables to the total R2. The Owen value decomposition is a generalisation of the
Shapley value decomposition and is suitable to assert the relative importance of groups of regressors
for explaining the variance of the dependent variable (Huettner, 2012). To the best of our knowledge,
such an assessment has not yet been done in the literature on income measurement error. To assess
both time-varying and time-constant explanatory variables, the decomposition is based on pooled
cross-sectional models for all four years with the difference between survey and register data as the
dependent variable.
4 Results
Before turning to the results of the econometric exercise, we study the unconditional existence of a
social desirability bias and a learning effect in the data.
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Notes: This graph shows the mean relative difference between survey responses and register information on wages, old-age and
unemployment benefits by percentile of corresponding income distribution and year of the interview. Positive values in the
lower half of the distribution imply structural over-reporting, whereas negative values above the median indicate
under-reporting in surveys at the top. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
Figure 1: Social desirability – SILC 2008-2011
Figure 1 shows the average relative difference between the survey response and the register
entry per percentile of the distribution of wages, pensions, and unemployment benefits. Overall,
the typical pattern of a mean-reverting error is visible. Thus, respondents in lower income percentiles
of a specific income type report values that are higher than their register records and vice versa
for respondents at the upper part of the distribution.4 The pattern is most distinctive for wages
and least pronounced for unemployment benefits, but in general corresponds to the expected social
desirability behaviour.
4The figure is cut between a relative mismatch of +50% and −25%.
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Figure 2 illustrates the learning effect over the four survey waves. The lines depict the absolute
logarithmic difference between the two data sources in the mean, the median, the 25th, and the 75th
percentile. For wages, we find a slight reduction in the differences for all observed income quantiles
after the first wave. A small error reduction over time is also present in the 25th quantile and the
median of unemployment benefits. In contrast, for pension income, the error does not seem to
decrease over time. Thus, the data displays no or, if anything, a very small learning effect.5
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Notes: This graph shows the median as well as the 25th and 75th percentile of the absolute values of relative difference between
survey responses and register information on wages, old-age and unemployment benefits by wave of the interview (i.e. negative
values have been multiplied by −1). A reduction of absolute errors over time would be evidence for a learning effect in repeated
interrogations, however the data display no strong support for this hypothesis. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
Figure 2: Learning effect – SILC 2008-2011
In what follows, we will test whether the observed patterns of mean-reverting errors and the
learning effect remain valid in a multivariate model. Given that we control for a variety of variables
capturing the complexity of the annual income stream (e.g. employment status changes), a signifi-
cant effect of mean-reverting errors would emphasise the role of social desirability as an important
error source.
4.1 Likelihood of reporting more or less
Social desirability. For ease of interpretation, table 5 displays average marginal effects derived
from the multinomial logit models.6 For all three types of personal income, the estimates for the
corresponding income deciles—with the 5th decile as reference category—confirm the mean-reverting
error. Thus, compared to the middle of the wage distribution, the likelihood of underreporting is
significantly lower in the bottom deciles and significantly higher in the top deciles. Vice versa,
the probability of overreporting increases by up to 51 percentage points in the first decile and is
significantly lower in higher deciles.
5Figure B.1 in the Appendix replicates figure 2, however, using only observations that remained in the panel in all
four waves, i.e. from 2008 to 2011. With this sample the outcome for pensions and unemployment benefits resembles
that of the unbalanced sample. For wages, the learning effect almost disappears.
6Full tables with the estimates expressed in log(odds) are available from the authors upon request.
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For pensions, this pattern is very similar although less pronounced since the average marginal ef-
fects of income deciles on both underreporting and particularly overreporting are smaller. Finally,
recipients of unemployment benefits are no exception from the general pattern. Higher unem-
ployment benefits correspond to a higher likelihood of underreporting and a lower likelihood of
overreporting. Effects are statistically significant at the 5% level for almost all deciles. If we look at
the probability of roughly similar income levels in both sources (S = A), lower income groups tend
to report correct wages less often than middle-income groups. To a smaller extent, this also applies
to the highest deciles. For pensions, changes in the probability of S = A are more symmetrically
spread around the middle whereas for unemployment benefits, income deciles generally do not have
strong statistically significant effects.
Summing up, we interpret these results as evidence of an income-mean-reverting type of social
desirability. The estimations also reveal that the mean-reverting pattern does not exclusively apply
to wages but seems to be present also for non-market income and transfer payments.
Socio-demographic characteristics. Males have a significantly higher/lower tendency of
overreporting/underreporting all three types of income. Overall, the gender-specific effect is largest
for wages. Related to that, men display a slightly lower propensity to report matching values
for wages. These results could reflect some underlying male breadwinner/masculinity norm which
ceteris paribus renders men to overreport market income more often. Based on this argument, we
also expected rather men to conceal receipt of non-market transfers. However, our estimates for
unemployment benefits do not provide support for the latter hypothesis. Concerning education,
we find significant differences between respondents with higher educational attainments compared
to compulsory education for wages and pensions. Underreporting decreases whereas overreporting
increases with the educational level. For the point estimates it also does not make much difference
whether respondents hold a post-secondary or a tertiary degree. Contrary to what we have expected
for unemployment benefits, there is no evidence that underreporting is an increasing function of
education. All education dummies are statistically insignificant in this model. In line with the
results for social desirability (income percentiles) and gender, it seems that there is no big social
stigma related to levels of unemployment transfers (assuming that the other control variables capture
cognitive errors sufficiently). Instead, it is possible that these transfers are generally regarded as
legally acquired insurance payments. Age only exerts a statistically significant, albeit very small
negative effect on the likelihood of underreporting unemployment benefits.
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Table 5: Multinomial logit regressions
Wages Pensions Unemp. benefits
S<A S=A S>A S<A S=A S>A S<A S=A S>A
(i) Social desirability
Realtive income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile -28.3 -21.5 49.8 -15.2 -16.8 32.0 -22.4 -5.0 27.4
2. Decile -17.8 -17.0 34.7 -4.3 -5.8 10.1 -11.0 -3.0 14.0
3. Decile -11.2 -12.1 23.3 -4.2 -1.5 5.7 -0.3 -6.5 6.7
4. Decile -2.0 -7.7 9.7 0.9 -3.9 3.0 -1.0 -5.5 6.5
6. Decile 8.5 -0.8 -7.7 8.7 -6.5 -2.2 10.4 1.8 -12.1
7. Decile 14.2 -1.3 -12.9 8.1 -7.6 -0.5 8.9 -0.5 -8.4
8. Decile 18.6 -3.3 -15.3 9.5 -7.9 -1.7 17.1 1.0 -18.1
9. Decile 27.1 -7.4 -19.6 12.7 -8.0 -4.7 20.8 7.6 -28.3
10. Decile 38.6 -14.7 -23.9 24.2 -19.1 -5.1 31.4 5.6 -37.1
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender (Ref: Female)
Male -10.7 -3.7 14.5 -4.8 -0.8 5.6 -5.3 -2.3 7.6
Age
Age 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0
Education (Ref: Compulsory)
Upper secondary -8.1 0.7 7.5 -5.4 2.5 2.8 4.2 -0.4 -3.8
Post-secondary -8.8 -0.3 9.0 -6.9 2.6 4.2 -5.6 -0.5 6.1
1st stage tertiary -11.0 1.2 9.8 -4.4 -0.5 4.9 2.3 -5.2 2.9
2nd stage tertiary -4.1 -3.8 7.9 1.4 1.8 -3.2 -7.2 7.3 -0.2
Country of birth (Ref: AUT)
EU15 -4.1 0.2 3.9 -2.8 -8.5 11.3 -0.4 0.6 -0.2
CEE -2.7 0.4 2.3 0.4 -1.3 0.9 10.5 -7.4 -3.1
Turkey 6.6 -1.0 -5.6 4.1 -0.8 -3.2 -4.7 0.4 4.4
Yugosphere 5.1 -5.1 -0.1 4.9 -6.1 1.2 6.7 -5.9 -0.8
other 7.9 -5.2 -2.7 0.1 2.4 -2.6 -1.5 -1.1 2.5
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad -5.1 2.5 2.7 -2.5 5.7 -3.2 10.7 0.5 -11.2
Fair -4.2 0.1 4.1 -2.7 7.8 -5.1 2.9 4.8 -7.7
Good -8.0 1.7 6.3 -4.3 9.9 -5.6 6.8 1.7 -8.5
Very good -12.9 1.8 11.1 -8.8 10.8 -2.0 5.1 5.0 -10.1
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: < 10 000 inhabitants)
> 10000 & < 100000 -1.6 2.1 -0.5 -4.1 3.5 0.5 -3.7 1.6 2.0
>100 000 inhabitants -4.6 1.6 3.1 -4.8 3.1 1.7 -8.7 3.1 5.6
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once 4.6 -4.4 -0.2 30.8 -24.0 -6.8 8.6 -5.3 -3.2
Twice 4.7 -0.7 -4.0 30.5 -29.1 -1.4 9.2 -6.2 -3.0
Thrice or more -0.6 -6.3 6.9 15.7 -9.7 -6.1 13.1 -8.1 -5.0
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months 27.4 -8.1 -19.3 4.0 -6.5 2.5 40.8 3.5 -44.3
6-8 months 11.7 -5.6 -6.1 -9.1 2.2 6.9 16.4 3.4 -19.8
9-11 months 3.5 -6.6 3.1 4.0 -12.0 8.0 10.7 3.6 -14.4
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI -2.2 2.9 -0.7 -2.1 2.8 -0.7 -5.6 7.5 -1.8
Interviewer
Same interviewer 0.9 1.1 -2.0 0.1 1.6 -1.7 -8.4 6.9 1.5
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 7.9 -5.8 -2.2 3.8 -5.6 1.8 0.3 -0.7 0.4
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 2.3 -2.9 0.6 1.3 -2.5 1.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0
Sept. to Nov. 2.2 -5.7 3.5 8.6 -9.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 -0.8
Year of interview (Ref: 2008)
2009 -0.2 -0.8 1.0 0.3 -2.7 2.4 -2.3 -1.7 4.0
2010 0.5 0.1 -0.6 2.8 -3.7 0.9 2.1 3.6 -5.7
2011 -0.7 -0.2 0.9 -30.4 46.9 -16.5 1.1 1.5 -2.6
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd -1.4 0.4 1.0 3.0 -3.1 0.1 7.4 -5.8 -1.5
3rd -1.8 0.8 1.0 2.0 -4.5 2.5 4.2 -5.9 1.8
4th -2.8 2.0 0.7 2.1 -2.3 0.2 4.0 -1.7 -2.3
Notes: This table shows the estimated average marginal effects of multinomial regressions per income type (wages, pensions and
unemployment benefits) in three categories: (1) S<A: reported income is below the value in administrative data (2) S=A: survey income
corresponds to administrative data. (3) S>A: reported income is above the value in administrative data. Estimates with an associated
p–value below 0.01 are depicted in bold, values below 0.05 in italics. Insignificant estimates (p–value above 0.05) are given in gray.
Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Being born in a CEE7 country does not make a significant difference for the likelihood of misre-
porting wages compared to Austria, whereas we find a higher probability of underreporting wages
for the Yugosphere8, Turkey and other countries of birth (and a corresponding lower propensity to
report matching wages). For the remaining two income components, the country of birth is less rele-
vant with two exceptions: being born in the EU15 significantly raises the likelihood of overreporting
pensions by 11%-points. Furthermore, natives from the Yugosphere bear a higher probability of
underreporting unemployment benefits. Summing up, the evidence hints to remaining problems of
correctly understanding the data collection process by non-natives but this is primarily an issue for
the underreporting of wages.
Health problems are expected to hinder income reporting. The strongest evidence for a de-
creasing probability of misreporting with improved health is found for pensions. Related to that,
respondents tend to provide correct pension incomes the healthier they are. Better health also
reduces the likelihood of underreporting wages but this is only significant when we compare those
in very good health to those with very bad health. However, this pattern is completely reversed
for overreporting wages. Moreover, there is no evidence for a relationship between health and the
misreporting of unemployment benefits.
For all three types of income, underreporting is less prevalent, if the respondent’s place of
residence is in a highly urbanised region. In the case of overreporting, this relation is insignificant
for pensions and inverted for wages and unemployment benefits. As we expected any kind of
misreporting to be reduced with rising degree of urbanisation, the latter result could e.g. be due to
differences in types of jobs and the associated wage structures in urbanised regions.
As an indicator for income stability, we include variables capturing the number of status changes
and the number of months spent in a specific employment status. As expected, Table 5 exhibits that
status changes correspond to higher probabilities of misreporting and to lower chances to report
correct incomes. In general, the effects show significantly higher probabilities for underreporting,
particularly for pensions and unemployment benefits. Furthermore, we find that overreporting
unemployment benefits is 41%-points more likely if the spell was shorter than 6 months and 16%-
points more likely if the spell lasted between 6 and 8 months during the income reference period. An
explanation for this finding could be that particularly short spells of unemployment are associated
with recall and telescoping errors. There are no significant average marginal effects of the number of
months on the probability of a match between the two data sources. Overreporting unemployment
benefits is 44%-points less likely for short-term recipients than for long-term recipients. This general
pattern is similar for underreported wages but almost nonexistent for pension incomes.
Survey setting. Against what we have expected, average marginal effects of telephone in-
terviews (CATI) on both types of misreporting are generally negative, however, statistically not
significant. For wages, responses from CATI are 3%-points more likely to match administrative
records than from CAPI. Proxy interviews increase the probability of underreporting wages and
pensions. For wages, there is also a marginally negative effect on overreporting. Proxy interviews
neither have an effect on overreporting of pensions nor on any type of misreporting of unemploy-
7Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia
8Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia
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ment benefits. Moreover, having the same interviewer as in the previous year does not have a major
impact on misreporting. Only unemployment benefits are slightly less likely to be underreported.
Looking at the month of the interview, we find that reporting errors for wages are more likely,
the later in the year the interview is conducted, i.e. the larger the time span between the income
reference period and the interview. For pensions, however, this applies only to more distant interview
months (>8 months) and is only statistically significant for underreporting. For unemployment
benefits, there is no significant relationship at all. Finally, the interview year generally does not
play any significant role. The large and significant time effects for pensions in 2011 partly appear
by design because (only) for this year, Statistics Austria already derived a great share of pension
incomes from registers before they back-calculated the Austrian SILC.
Learning effect. As already indicated by the descriptive illustration in figure 2, the multinomial
logit model based on pooled cross-sections does not yield strong evidence for learning effects. In
fact, we find slightly lower probabilities to provide correct answers for pensions and unemployment
benefits for respondents in advanced survey waves. In the next step, we will apply panel regressions
which additionally purge unobservable individual fixed effects, for this question and test whether
this preliminary result holds.
To sum up the results of the logit models, the average marginal effects suggest that the income
level and socio-demographic characteristics are far more relevant than the interview context for
explaining reporting errors. Relative importance, however, will be investigated more systematically
further below. Moreover, the general patterns found for social desirability (income percentiles)
and for gender, age, education among the sociodemographic factors are quite similar for all three
income types. Concerning the survey setting, effects for wages and pensions are close, whereas
unemployment benefits are hardly influenced by this set of variables.
4.2 Extent of misreporting
In a next step, we employ individual fixed effects OLS panel regressions to gain further insights
on the presence of social desirability bias and learning effects. The results of the panel estimation
for the two subjects are displayed in tables 6 and 7, respectively. Although we present only the
estimated coefficients relevant for these two errors sources, the estimations were done using the full
set of controls, corresponding to table 5. The remainder of the estimates is contained in tables B.2
and B.3 in the Appendix.
Social desirability. The dependent variable in the panel regression focusing on the evaluation
of social desirability is the negative or positive absolute difference between the survey report and
the administrative record. We find that the difference between questionnaire and register wages
increases with rising distance from the middle of the distribution. This effect is more pronounced
at higher percentiles as compared to lower quantiles. For instance, in the lowest decile the average
overreporting is 7,400 Euros above the error in the 5th decile, whereas the difference amounts to
11,600 Euros in the top decile. A similar pattern is present for differences in pensions, although
only statistically significant at both ends of the distribution. In the case of unemployment benefits,
point estimates roughly indicate a mean-reverting pattern in the longitudinal perspective. Only
some quantiles show statistically significant differences from the average error in the 5th decile and
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Table 6: Panel regression results – Social desirability
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 7387.25 (1020.64) 3536.36 (764.73) 192.52 (1048.41)
2. Decile 5765.24 (776.71) 1775.13 (684.73) 516.38 (441.90)
3. Decile 3524.27 (698.17) 1098.89 (471.01) −33.88 (834.57)
4. Decile 1631.32 (362.68) −136.74 (372.11) 182.32 (471.82)
6. Decile −1449.64 (509.38) −349.92 (330.50) −625.39 (661.51)
7. Decile −2972.27 (653.50) −1389.06 (982.90) −799.96 (937.23)
8. Decile −4425.72 (841.99) −2143.49 (1184.84) −1387.76 (701.87)
9. Decile −8118.60 (1319.65) −3420.77 (773.14) −1554.50 (705.41)
10. Decile −11598.02 (1696.99) −6968.90 (1769.55) −2839.05 (831.64)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics yes yes yes
(iii) Survey setting yes yes yes
(iv) Learning effect yes yes yes
Num. obs. 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.70 0.72 0.81
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.32 0.41 0.30
Notes: This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with positive and negative reporting errors
as dependent variable (i.e. negative values correspond to under-reporting and positive values to over-reporting).
Cluster robust standard errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect models relies on sufficiently
large with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the baseline
specification. See full list of estimated coefficients in Table B.2. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
indicate underreporting at the top.
Learning effect. Table 7 presents additional evidence on the presence of learning effects.
Note that we define the learning effect as a decline in the absolute reporting errors over multiple
survey waves. In this case, we do not distinguish between over- and underreporting and thus
negative values of the dependent variable are multiplied by minus one. We find mixed evidence
for learning effects, which crucially depend on the type of income under consideration. For wages
and unemployment benefits, there is no statistically significant reduction of reporting errors with
increasing panel duration, whereas such a pattern clearly emerges for pension incomes. For wages,
our results are in line with previous literature finding a positive, although not statistically significant,
serial correlation of misreporting.
Robustness checks. We applied two robustness checks for our baseline panel specification: (1)
estimations based on the 4-wave balanced sample using longitudinal weights (see tables B.4 & B.5),
(2) specifications with the difference in log income between register and survey data as dependent
variable (see tables B.6 & B.7). The panel regressions for the balanced sample broadly confirm the
social desirability effects although with slightly smaller point estimates. Surprisingly, the already
small learning effect for pension income disappears completely in the balanced 4-wave panel. In the
second check, we test whether our conclusions remain valid when studying the relative deviations of
survey answers from administrative records. Overall, the models with the difference of the natural
logs of incomes have a higher model fit. Mean-reverting errors found in the baseline model are
observed again and have a similar pattern of statistical significance. Again, learning effects are only
present for pensions where the model predicts a reduction of the difference between survey and
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Table 7: Panel regression results – Learning effect
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −164.75 (631.32) −1622.45 (264.10) 191.71 (300.39)
3rd −353.89 (770.74) −2546.06 (520.99) 231.58 (433.76)
4th −478.33 (959.25) −3397.04 (821.01) 144.55 (568.08)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
(i) Social desirability yes yes yes
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics yes yes yes
(iii) Survey setting yes yes yes
Num. obs. 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.74 0.71 0.82
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.40 0.39 0.31
Notes: This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with absolute values of the reporting errors as
dependent variable (i.e. negative values (under-reporting) have been multiplied by −1). Cluster robust standard
errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect models relies on sufficiently large with-in variation,
the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the baseline specification. See full list
of estimated coefficients in Table B.3. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
register data of approximately 19% in the last panel wave.
4.3 Relative importance of error sources
Finally, we apply an Owen value decomposition in order to assess the relative importance of the
four error sources under consideration. The decomposition aims to assign a proportion of the
explained variance to groups of the explanatory variables. We consider two connected settings. First,
reporting errors and income variables enter the regressions transformed via the inverse hyperbolic
sine function. This transformation is closely related to the well known logarithmic transformation,
however, it is also defined for negative and zero values. In the context of a significant mass of
zeros and negative values among the reporting errors, this is a desirable property as it allows us
to consider the same number of observations as in the preceding calculations. The results of this
exercise are given in table 8.
The first row contains the adjusted R2 for each cross-sectional model. The total variance ex-
plained is clearly highest for reporting mismatch in unemployment benefits, where 46% can be
traced back to the model variables. In contrast, for wage and pension differences the corresponding
figures amount to 16% and 11% respectively. Noteworthy, especially for unemployment benefits,
but also in the case of wages and pensions, the magnitude of explained variance in our regression
is comperatively high (Kim and Tamborini, 2012). The remaining rows show the group sums of
Owen values as percentage of the overall R2. While the patterns for wages and pensions are rather
similar, unemployment benefits show a quite different picture. For the former two, around 30% of
the explained variance can be attributed to the group of socio-demographic variables, whereas social
desirability turns out to be of the highest relative importance (around 60%). For wage differences,
the survey setting and variables measuring the panel participation (and thus learning effects) vir-
tually do not contribute to the total R2 at all. Learning effects also play a minor role for pensions
whereas the survey setting contributes roughly 15%.
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Outcomes are considerably different for unemployment benefits. With a share of 65%, the
group of socio-demographic variables is most relevant for overall R2. Compared to the models for
wages and pensions, social desirability is substantially less important whereas the socio-demographic
characteristics gain relevance. Thus, misreporting of unemployment benefits does not so much
depend on the level of unemployment benefits but rather on socio-demographic characteristics of
the recipients and is also more sensitive to the interview context and mode.
Table 8: Decomposition of explained variance – SILC 2008-2011
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
Proportion of variance explained 15.8 11.4 46.4
Relative importance:
(i) Social desirability 65.1 58.8 23.7
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics 34.0 24.5 64.5
(iii) Survey setting 0.8 14.5 9.2
(iv) Learning effect 0.0 2.2 2.6
Notes: This table shows the goodness-of-fit of OLS regressions and its decomposition to
four error sources, i.e. four groups of explanatory variables. We quantify the relative
importance of (i) social desirability, (ii) socio-demographic characteristics, (iii) aspects of
the survey design, and (iv) learning effects on the basis of separate regressions for wages,
pensions and unemployment benefits. Reporting errors are regressed on the same set of
explanatory variables that were used before (see section 3), using all available pooled
cross-sections. Error and income variables are transformed via the inverse hyperbolic sine
function, which facilitates a log-log interpretation in the context of a significant mass of
zeros and negative values among the errors. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
Additionally, we repeat the same procedure without transforming the input variables (see table
B.8 in the online appendix). Whereas the results on old-age and unemployment benefits are almost
identical, the R2 of the wage regression drops by two thirds. However, our estimates on the relative
importance of the four error sources are hardly affected, which strengthens our confidence in the
robustness of our findings.
5 Conclusions
Income is very likely one of the most pervasive information in micro datasets, since it plays an essen-
tial role for a wide range of welfare indicators and policy questions. The traditional way of collecting
income information are household surveys, however, the accuracy of survey data has increasingly
been contested during the last years. A main factor behind this critique is the suspected presence
of measurement error in surveys, resulting from (un)intentional misreporting. The identification of
data errors requires by definition some point of reference. We follow the traditional literature and
check survey data against administrative records using a unique dataset: the Austrian 2008-2011
waves of EU-SILC. We make use of the fact that due to a legal initiative, the Austrian SILC provides
both survey and register income data for the same observational units for four consecutive years.
While the vast majority of existing research assesses measurement error in income data for US
households, there is virtually no research using European panel data for various income types. EU-
SILC is a key dataset for social policy issues since it provides the main indicators for evaluating
the Europe 2020 strategy. Given its importance as reference source for comparative statistics on
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income distribution and social inclusion, data quality is a crucial matter. Compared to previous
literature, using the Austrian EU-SILC for assessing income measurement error has two main ad-
vantages. First, we do not have to fall back on two-sample matching processes since agreement
from respondents concerning data linkage was not legally required. This advantage helps to avoid
selection bias and, given that the Austrian EU-SILC is representative for the national population
residing in private households, ensures high external validity. Second, we are able to evaluate in-
come measurement error for various components of total disposable household income in the very
same dataset.
We elaborate four major reasons for misreporting discussed in the literature: social desirability,
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent, specifics of the survey design and the presence
of learning effects for three types of personal income (wages, pensions and unemployment benefits).
The main findings are the following. For personal income and in line with the existing litera-
ture, statistically significant mean-reverting errors are revealed in both, cross-sectional and panel
regression models. We find significantly lower probabilities of underreporting at the bottom of the
wage distribution and vice versa, higher likelihoods of overreporting at the top tail. By including
a broad range of control variables in order to capture the complexity of the annual income stream,
we interpret this result as evidence of social desirability in reporting wages. Although the effects
are generally less pronounced and sometimes even statistically insignificant, similar patterns occur
for pension income and unemployment benefits.
Concerning socio-demographic characteristics, males are found to have a significantly higher
tendency of overreporting wages, pensions, and unemployment benefits. Additionally, there is a sig-
nificant relationship between health and misreporting, for instance, good health conditions correlate
with more correct survey responses particularly for pensions. The higher chances of underreporting
for respondents being born outside the EU–15 hint to the presence of language and comprehension
problems, despite the fact that interviews were also conducted in other languages if requested by
respondents. We find consistent evidence that a complex income and employment context with
many changes during the income reference period hinders recall, and thus increases misreporting.
Multiple changes in the employment status have a strong effect on reporting errors of pensions, a
shorter status duration increases errors particularly for unemployment benefits and wages.
For survey designers, the Owen value decomposition might be of particular interest since it re-
veals that social desirability is a major explanation for misreporting wages and pension income. For
unemployment benefits, socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents seem to play the major
role for reporting errors. The survey setting is relatively less important for explaining misreport-
ing, while learning effects are hardly noticeable. Our findings from the Owen value decomposition
suggest that data producers should be even more aware of social desirability when constructing
interview questionnaires. The order and wording of questions on income could incite or inhibit
erroneous income reports. It is crucial that survey responses should be validated by actual income
proofs, such as pay slips. If wages of employees are available online in web portals of the finan-
cial authorities (like in Austria), data producers could possibly push on cross-checking with these
sources. Moreover, proxy interviews show significantly higher probabilities of misreporting than
personal interviews. Similarly, the larger the time span between the income reference period and
the interview, the more likely is misreporting. Evidence on the presence of a learning effects is
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mixed and depends crucially on the type of income under consideration.
Survey users may be interested in the various types of bias that result from measurement error
in linear models. In table B.10 of the supplementary materials, we present estimates of three types
of bias: bias in OLS estimators due to measurement error in the explanatory variables, bias in IV
estimators due to measurement error in the explanatory variables, and bias due to measurement
error in the dependent variable. Quantifying the bias that is associated to misreporting gives data
users and practitioners some guidance on what to expect when they use (or read publications using)
income data from SILC in regression models. For instance, we find that all results estimating
returns (e.g. of education) on wages are underestimated by about 25%. However, we advice against
interpreting these results as general attenuation bias of survey income data. The reasons for and
structure of misreporting might vary considerably across countries.
For policy makers, our results point to the fact that for some socio-demographic groups —
including those most relevant for policy makers— survey income data may potentially be an infirm
ground for decision-making. Thus, investments in the development, maintenance, advancement, and
accessibility of public administrative data, as an alternative, may pay-off for better targeted polices.
Having both survey and register data at hand for the same units opens up several perspectives for
further research. For instance, a next step could be to look at the joint distribution of errors for
respondents that have more than one of the three income components at once in a given year and
check if those who underreport one source are also more likely to underreport another. It could
also be worthwhile to replicate our analysis based on gross income values. Another fruitful avenue
for further inquiries could be to train a statistical model that allows survey producers to correct
the income information based on other unobservable characteristics of the respondents. Moreover,
income is a key explanatory variable in social science research. As in Hariri and Lassen (2017),
one could therefore check how conclusions for prominent regressions where income is used as right-
hand-side variable (health, well-being, etc.) are altered when survey data is replaced by register
data.
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A Data appendix
a) Administrative sources of income variables
i) Wages (variable py010):
The starting point for the wage information in the administrative data are the pay slips that em-
ployers have to transmit to the fiscal authorities administrated by the Austrian Ministry of Finance.
Further, the Austrian Federal Computing Center (BRZ) receives the raw pay slips from the Min-
istry and forwards them electronically to Statistics Austria. To avoid processing errors, the institute
then undertakes a broad range of quality checks and discards invalid records. Full details on the
process of data transmission by employers and data cleaning by the public authorities are available
in sections 2.2. and 3. of the Standard-Dokumentation Metainformationen zur Lohnsteuerstatistik
(only in German unfortunately).
Three different datasets are used to construct the wage variable (see also Statistik Austria 2014)
1. The main source is the Austrian Wage Tax Data (Lohnsteuerstatistik) which contains infor-
mation on all taxable earnings of employees and pensioners. The dataset includes wages,
public pensions (retirement benefits), paid maternity leave (8 weeks before and after expected
birth date) and sickness benefits. The data comprises information on gross income, paid social
security contributions and retained payroll taxes. Moreover, care allowances are available in
the data, although they are not taxable in Austria.
2. The second source is the Austrian Social Security Data. While this source does not supply
income information, it indicates the social security status, e.g. whether individuals are eligible
for unemployment benefits, disability benefits etc. Specifically, it is used to calculate the
income from compulsory military (6 months) or civil service (9 months) for male citizens.
These earnings are tax free and thus not included in the wage tax data. Statistics Austria
calculate the monthly income based on their social security status and the average payment
in the standardized scheme.
3. The third source is the Austrian Tax Adjustment Dataset, which includes total repayments
or receipts for tax adjustment in a given year for employee earnings. This data is important
for employees living in Austria but working abroad (cross-border commuters). This group is
not comprised in the wage tax data; however, these employees have to declare their income
in tax returns. Finally, Statistics Austria identifies cross-border commuters from these tax
returns and imputes their incomes. Note, that we exclude fully imputed observations from
our sample.
In Austria, wages are contractually agreed between employers and employees and underlie cer-
tain controls by supervising bodies (like social security authorities or financial police). When the
employer registers an employee for social security, the wage has to be stated. At this point, tax
avoidance is practically impossible. Employers are obliged to transmit the pay slips directly to
the tax authorities each month, while employees only receive the net wage after taxes and social
contributions.
A-i
In EU-SILC, there are efforts to capture unregistered income (typically cash-in-hand jobs) that
are not reported in administrative data. After running through all income component questions, the
survey contains two final questions that ask for “further income”. However, concerning such untaxed
income of private individuals, e.g. which they generate by doing chores and selling their skills, we
argue that this is rather income from self-employment (py050) than income from employment. It
is very likely that labor for such activities is sold outside a principal-agent setup. Exactly this
reasoning is reflected by Eurostat: the wage income definition of Eurostat (and Statistics Austria)
does NOT include such types of income.
ii) Old-age benefits (variable py100):
Statistics Austria uses multiple data sources to record old-age benefits. The main origin of
administrative data is the above-mentioned wage tax register which contains all old-age pensions
subject to taxation including second pillar pensions. However, the variable py100 also captures
transitional payments for long-term unemployed persons shortly before retirement and survivor’s
as well as accident benefits for persons older than the official retirement age. The first variable is
delivered by the Public Employment Service Austria (AMS), the latter two are provided by the
“Dataset for benefits to accident victims and surviving dependents”. The numbers in these datasets
correspond to actual payments and thus are practically error-free. (Statistik Austria, 2014, p 598)
Tax avoidance is not an issue for old-age benefits as they are managed and paid out by public
authorities. There is no incentive to report lower pension payments than actually are paid out.
iii) Unemployment benefits (variable py090)
For this variable, only one public dataset is used: the so-called “transfers dataset on unem-
ployment benefits” from the Public Employment Service Austria (AMS). It contains the beginning
and ending date of unemployment spells and thus the benefits on a daily basis. The AMS also
manages the payment of these benefits and thus there should be virtually no errors in the data.
Based on a correspondence with data managers from the AMS, the data generating process for the
unemployment benefits can be summarized as follows:
The AMS IT generates a clearly identifiable entry for each client (defined as those being eligible
for unemployment benefits). Numerous validity checks with other public IT systems and databases
(e.g. with data from social security) ensure that neither double entries (for the same person) nor
identifier confusion occur. The AMS then calculates the level of payments for each beneficiary
and transfers these figures to the Austrian Federal Computing Centre (BRZ). The BRZ recalculates
benefit claims and sends the final results for each client back to the AMS IT. The latter data transfer
(fully automatic without human intervention) constitutes the final data entry that is also relevant
for our analysis. Furthermore, the BRZ also makes the final money transfer to the beneficiaries.
There is thus an incentive to avoid errors as these cause costs and client complaints. Similar to
old-age pensions, there is no incentive for public authorities to report lower unemployment benefits
than actually are paid out.
A-ii
b) Identifier linking process
Austrian law stipulates that the linkage of personal micro data from surveys with registers be done
using an anonymized personal identifier (bPIN). These 172-digit PINs are created by the Austrian
Data Protection Commission. The identifier then is used as a cryptographically secure way to link
survey and register data since it is available for (almost) every person and all registers (without the
need to seek consent of the respondents).
Naturally the linkage to administrative data requires valid personal identifiers for the sample
population covered by the survey. Usually, this information is already collected as part of the
sampling procedure. However, there are always individuals who turn out to be actual household
members but are not covered by the sampling frame (mainly because they are not officially registered
at a household’s address). Their PIN is missing ex ante and has to be retrieved by a procedure
involving the Federal Ministry for the Interior. The share of available identifiers for the total
population in the survey is high and ranges between 96 % (2008) and 99 % (2011). For 2008–2011
missing keys most often occur among younger people, persons living in Vienna (capital) and persons
with non-Austrian citizenship. With the exception of EU-SILC 2011, the proportion of missing keys
for women was higher than for men among all age groups (by about 1 percentage point). Therefore,
using register data results in an under-reporting of income data for those groups.
Further details on the link between register and survey data can also be found in section 10.2.
of Heuberger et al. (2013).
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Notes: This graph shows the median as well as the 25th and 75th percentile of the absolute values of relative difference between
survey responses and register information on wages, old-age and unemployment benefits by wave of the interview (i.e. negative
values have been multiplied by −1). The underlying sample is a balanced panel of individuals that participated in the survey
four times. A reduction of absolute errors over time would be evidence for a learning effect in repeated interrogations, however
the data display no strong support for this hypothesis. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
Figure B.1: Learning effect - Participated in all four waves– SILC 2008-2011
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Table B.1: Distribution of response categories – SILC 2008-2011
Wages Pensions Unemp. benefits
S<A S=A S>A S<A S=A S>A S<A S=A S>A
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender
Female 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.45 0.43 0.39
Male 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.55 0.57 0.61
Education
Compulsory 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.26 0.30 0.32
Upper secondary 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.64 0.59 0.57
Post-secondary 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05
1st stage tertiary 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05
2nd stage tertiary 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Age
Age 40.05 39.27 35.99 70.11 70.63 70.42 38.10 42.08 37.88
Country of birth
AUT 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.71 0.76 0.68
EU15 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
EU10 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Yugosphere 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.10
Turkey 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.08
other 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.07
Health status
Very bad 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03
Bad 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.10
Fair 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.21 0.31 0.27
Good 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.34
Very good 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.26 0.26
Degree of urbanisation
<10 000 inhabitants 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.45 0.43
>10 000 and <100 000 inhabitants 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.19
>100 000 inhabitants 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.36 0.38
Changes in employment status
None 0.81 0.87 0.75 0.95 0.99 0.96 0.23 0.41 0.38
Once 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.40 0.33 0.33
Thrice or more 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.06
Twice 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.20 0.23
Months in corresponding employment status
<6 months 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.72 0.52 0.51
6-8 months 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.13
9-11 months 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.06
12 months 0.79 0.86 0.70 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.13 0.30 0.30
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview
CAPI 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.67
CATI 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.33
Type of interview
Personal 0.81 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.88 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.87
Proxy 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.13
Month of interview
March to May 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.37 0.60 0.37 0.50 0.52 0.47
June to Aug. 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.55 0.37 0.56 0.43 0.43 0.46
Sept. to Nov. 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07
Notes: This table shows the distribution of socio-economic and interview related statistics per income type (wages, pensions
and unemployment benefits) in three categories: (1) S<A: reported income is below the value in administrative data (2) S=A:
survey income corresponds to administrative data. (3) S>A: reported income is above the value in administrative data.
Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
A-iv
Table B.2: Full panel regression results – Social desirability
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 7387.25 (1020.64) 3536.36 (764.73) 192.52 (1048.41)
2. Decile 5765.24 (776.71) 1775.13 (684.73) 516.38 (441.90)
3. Decile 3524.27 (698.17) 1098.89 (471.01) −33.88 (834.57)
4. Decile 1631.32 (362.68) −136.74 (372.11) 182.32 (471.82)
6. Decile −1449.64 (509.38) −349.92 (330.50) −625.39 (661.51)
7. Decile −2972.27 (653.50) −1389.06 (982.90) −799.96 (937.23)
8. Decile −4425.72 (841.99) −2143.49 (1184.84) −1387.76 (701.87)
9. Decile −8118.60 (1319.65) −3420.77 (773.14) −1554.50 (705.41)
10. Decile −11598.02 (1696.99) −6968.90 (1769.55) −2839.05 (831.64)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Age 1041.45 (865.28) −699.76 (1444.45) 290.60 (697.79)
Age2 −12.07 (9.63) 5.53 (10.17) −3.15 (9.69)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad 652.46 (1011.68) 24.96 (399.12) −450.05 (804.55)
Fair 429.82 (894.88) −210.10 (396.13) −348.42 (822.66)
Good 387.15 (984.01) −177.94 (400.96) −378.85 (594.77)
Very good 748.99 (1061.87) 189.34 (414.51) −123.89 (708.52)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 −2491.82 (2885.74) 3930.92 (1754.64) −164.98 (1639.16)
>100 000 inhabitants −6859.11 (11983.43) 1405.62 (4139.35) −223.44 (1191.05)
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once −1016.75 (1146.34) −2498.45 (1036.00) −1587.53 (349.37)
Twice −812.94 (912.02) −1702.99 (1079.29) −1421.28 (524.98)
Thrice or more −800.33 (717.63) 725.26 (4035.64) −1153.15 (576.20)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months −4456.66 (1048.08) −280.56 (1450.14) −5114.40 (1440.46)
6-8 months −2098.93 (1309.92) −380.23 (2632.00) −4918.24 (2918.45)
9-11 months −1093.98 (1028.51) 232.64 (2295.04) −5103.07 (5069.19)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI 108.23 (596.98) −186.16 (532.93) 74.67 (1043.64)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 253.76 (596.98) −19.23 (670.13) −44.80 (497.64)
Interviewer
Same interviewer −365.98 (363.92) −106.27 (516.43) −107.55 (929.09)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 330.08 (318.84) −353.17 (97.35) −91.83 (204.94)
Sept. to Nov. 580.43 (469.05) −632.85 (412.93) −122.50 (694.32)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd 176.62 (607.60) 169.67 (480.78) −295.35 (928.96)
3rd 146.15 (688.70) 219.37 (514.02) −287.21 (912.64)
4th 125.91 (943.23) 66.61 (501.63) −421.60 (966.44)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Num. obs. 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.70 0.72 0.81
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.32 0.41 0.30
Notes: This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with positive and negative reporting
errors as dependent variable (i.e. negative values correspond to under-reporting and positive values to over-
reporting). Cluster robust standard errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect models
relies on sufficiently large with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been
removed from the baseline specification. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Table B.3: Full panel regression results – Learning effect
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 1969.83 (860.87) 759.50 (542.99) −763.05 (637.59)
2. Decile 1598.28 (1027.30) −130.17 (604.22) −483.91 (228.98)
3. Decile 1252.88 (428.70) −463.58 (606.05) −632.23 (577.18)
4. Decile 836.38 (371.02) −627.86 (348.83) 222.77 (181.61)
6. Decile −256.38 (293.93) 192.10 (266.99) −24.88 (393.59)
7. Decile −166.95 (492.04) 352.91 (586.66) −20.74 (385.66)
8. Decile 648.48 (733.64) 434.66 (762.01) 378.98 (453.58)
9. Decile 1104.73 (1273.15) 727.65 (1090.20) 72.25 (532.29)
10. Decile 3364.05 (1487.87) 4057.68 (1392.37) 484.78 (533.07)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Age 554.52 (656.51) 1289.72 (1233.35) 390.57 (495.37)
Age2 −5.74 (7.11) −5.53 (9.28) −4.78 (6.98)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad 643.14 (1223.03) 280.25 (468.71) 80.49 (578.47)
Fair 905.05 (1016.26) 42.28 (412.83) −249.82 (313.03)
Good 696.00 (954.01) 463.50 (591.92) 127.48 (522.65)
Very good 1022.07 (924.85) 38.76 (423.92) 23.68 (656.28)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 inhabitants −2520.54 (2787.27) 2953.45 (1362.68) −1308.86 (1399.41)
>100 000 inhabitants −7006.61 (10352.24) 597.81 (4176.38) −531.65 (1211.78)
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once 44.53 (982.68) 2081.64 (635.37) −179.53 (560.39)
Twice −503.86 (727.33) 552.73 (937.39) −189.54 (624.62)
Thrice or more −498.78 (1071.04) −40.26 (2197.32) −62.50 (815.18)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months −915.70 (916.26) 1167.80 (1745.76) −908.60 (3480.81)
6-8 months 285.80 (972.59) −2333.25 (3281.31) −1533.19 (4068.05)
9-11 months 577.78 (897.73) −3116.79 (2101.97) 1172.29 (4244.70)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI −204.82 (597.24) 288.37 (259.12) −250.47 (290.43)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 390.59 (533.37) 547.18 (370.68) 10.83 (208.57)
Interviewer
Same interviewer −37.90 (493.80) 301.58 (420.77) −336.48 (432.79)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 401.76 (305.70) 412.98 (102.85) −50.16 (180.07)
Sept. to Nov. 617.17 (549.12) 901.50 (320.56) 42.88 (573.35)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −164.75 (631.32) −1622.45 (264.10) 191.71 (300.39)
3rd −353.89 (770.74) −2546.06 (520.99) 231.58 (433.76)
4th −478.33 (959.25) −3397.04 (821.01) 144.55 (568.08)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Num. obs. 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.74 0.71 0.82
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.40 0.39 0.31
Notes: This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with absolute values of the reporting
errors as dependent variable (i.e. negative values (under-reporting) have been multiplied by −1). Cluster
robust standard errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect models relies on sufficiently
large with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the
baseline specification. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Table B.4: Full panel regression results – Social desirability – Balanced panel
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 6971.50 (1313.50) 2304.94 (1218.85) −570.89 (904.81)
2. Decile 5946.43 (1280.64) 1167.47 (970.35) 215.02 (617.07)
3. Decile 4242.16 (1298.96) 369.92 (1186.05) −343.08 (890.27)
4. Decile 2481.70 (679.79) −420.96 (1195.65) −495.25 (1066.41)
6. Decile −916.78 (751.95) −1174.41 (1044.57) −898.94 (812.39)
7. Decile −2443.69 (573.49) −2114.36 (1864.04) −416.95 (1016.83)
8. Decile −2713.74 (886.54) −2222.16 (2774.73) −536.64 (698.26)
9. Decile −6633.62 (1563.00) −4638.03 (2658.24) −2293.42 (629.81)
10. Decile −6935.37 (2286.25) −10015.24 (3544.56) −4123.79 (1087.79)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Age −91.24 (555.65) 85.93 (1075.20) 140.26 (795.41)
Age2 −3.98 (7.74) 3.88 (7.35) −1.08 (11.55)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad 3191.78 (2637.40) 90.69 (842.57) −502.13 (958.26)
Fair 2157.16 (2684.82) 95.38 (869.85) −1311.19 (682.15)
Good 2416.33 (2783.00) −184.89 (780.95) −424.30 (1277.91)
Very good 3441.87 (2693.37) 1121.60 (845.30) −200.50 (804.32)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 1057.53 (1214.26) −320.37 (554.14)
>100 000 inhabitants 2889.36 (3430.07) −1339.05 (1800.97) −4378.07 (1448.65)
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once 224.92 (2393.76) −2869.33 (1539.73) −1417.25 (455.06)
Twice −291.20 (1678.45) −833.09 (2000.12) −1309.01 (571.35)
Thrice or more −28.50 (1660.38) −243.54 (3708.31) −1137.83 (427.13)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months −4949.70 (1520.14) −71.61 (647.63)
6-8 months −2229.81 (2117.91) 3987.32 (1452.19)
9-11 months −2087.31 (1973.44) 1045.42 (1893.75) −8092.31 (1641.11)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI 1272.76 (819.10) 175.68 (1588.95) 166.76 (1042.71)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy −166.28 (431.34) −404.47 (539.96) −405.06 (527.97)
Interviewer
Same interviewer 680.92 (442.31) 72.43 (1678.76) −323.48 (1092.34)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 418.46 (319.76) −212.91 (316.33) −48.63 (330.03)
Sept. to Nov. 1577.45 (1524.67) −602.96 (691.62) −107.91 (627.76)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −1617.49 (923.46) −687.35 (1308.66) −332.03 (1014.64)
3rd −690.54 (766.69) −1651.54 (1145.86) −643.69 (1268.31)
4th 202.75 (930.00) −1548.11 (1073.00) −553.60 (1425.47)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Num. obs. 3736 1861 437
R2 (full model) 0.53 0.66 0.67
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.31 0.50 0.19
Notes: This table shows the results of balanced panel regressions with positive and negative reporting
errors as dependent variable (i.e. negative values correspond to under-reporting and positive values to over-
reporting). Cluster robust standard errors are given in parentheses.As identification in fixed effect models
relies on sufficiently large with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been
removed from the baseline specification. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Table B.5: Full panel regression results – Learning effect – Balanced panel
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 1868.99 (1021.66) −1136.84 (1118.39) −808.56 (566.24)
2. Decile 2189.35 (1217.60) −1167.98 (832.27) −718.11 (595.36)
3. Decile 1384.01 (802.00) −1512.10 (755.57) −390.53 (390.55)
4. Decile 1287.84 (811.26) −1248.46 (904.36) −711.36 (678.22)
6. Decile 151.92 (439.57) −1076.42 (1171.20) −87.61 (390.48)
7. Decile 234.32 (673.32) −1229.92 (1215.15) −246.06 (315.67)
8. Decile 1692.38 (1178.99) −1392.66 (1353.55) 365.76 (582.68)
9. Decile 1280.60 (2001.19) −1310.33 (2856.39) 585.48 (712.85)
10. Decile 2619.83 (2789.93) 1612.56 (3873.60) 497.41 (985.76)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Age 394.94 (602.54) 492.00 (609.37) 1035.11 (604.77)
Age2 −6.16 (8.29) −1.22 (3.28) −13.89 (8.80)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad 653.47 (803.95) 71.74 (500.55) −1014.31 (1455.56)
Fair 366.75 (823.02) 234.88 (538.00) −1222.66 (1006.02)
Good −150.33 (880.81) 443.86 (509.18) −850.89 (1238.92)
Very good 886.01 (878.31) −214.52 (500.48) −1254.88 (1333.87)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 −1490.76 (1374.83) −1120.65 (759.05)
>100 000 inhabitants 451.32 (2104.55) −1721.60 (760.44) 2829.69 (779.45)
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once 1132.60 (2370.60) 3370.75 (1141.89) 308.38 (658.66)
Twice 402.27 (1648.84) 772.80 (1902.82) 288.78 (452.71)
Thrice or more 760.89 (2176.22) 3082.17 (514.56) 269.06 (617.99)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months −1999.35 (1308.20) −476.34 (330.28)
6-8 months −674.07 (2581.14) 1524.54 (1184.56)
9-11 months −365.75 (2376.15) −5023.99 (1860.77) 3529.37 (965.18)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI 1606.78 (1096.31) −1232.58 (601.10) 951.70 (457.75)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 51.11 (467.45) 464.39 (367.94) −11.73 (499.10)
Interviewer
Same interviewer 1316.17 (671.17) −1360.22 (999.51) 691.92 (760.42)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 428.54 (277.48) 48.17 (223.24) −142.38 (273.23)
Sept. to Nov. 1201.99 (1440.25) 145.20 (702.48) −321.45 (289.05)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −2300.95 (1364.41) 743.14 (644.20) −978.94 (603.76)
3rd −1986.53 (1262.53) 781.45 (995.95) −1283.02 (812.28)
4th −2038.26 (1192.46) −1723.86 (1269.63) −1096.72 (583.18)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Num. obs. 3736 1861 437
R2 (full model) 0.49 0.68 0.70
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.25 0.52 0.27
Notes: This table shows the results of balanced panel regressions with absolute values of the reporting errors
as dependent variable (i.e. negative values (under-reporting) have been multiplied by −1). Cluster robust
standard errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect models relies on sufficiently large
with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the baseline
specification. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Table B.6: Full panel regression results – Social desirability – Log differences
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 1.51 (0.10) 0.54 (0.16) 1.43 (0.46)
2. Decile 0.74 (0.09) 0.19 (0.06) 0.70 (0.22)
3. Decile 0.34 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04) 0.17 (0.28)
4. Decile 0.13 (0.03) −0.00 (0.04) 0.12 (0.14)
6. Decile −0.11 (0.04) −0.02 (0.02) −0.21 (0.25)
7. Decile −0.21 (0.04) −0.09 (0.05) −0.33 (0.29)
8. Decile −0.30 (0.03) −0.14 (0.07) −0.40 (0.25)
9. Decile −0.44 (0.04) −0.20 (0.07) −0.34 (0.21)
10. Decile −0.54 (0.05) −0.29 (0.09) −0.53 (0.25)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Age 0.12 (0.06) −0.09 (0.12) 0.04 (0.21)
Age2 −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad 0.05 (0.10) −0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.34)
Fair 0.02 (0.11) −0.01 (0.03) 0.14 (0.33)
Good 0.02 (0.10) −0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.33)
Very good 0.04 (0.10) −0.00 (0.04) 0.14 (0.34)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 0.01 (0.11) 0.32 (0.18) −0.16 (0.40)
>100 000 inhabitants 0.03 (0.11) 0.06 (0.13) −0.07 (0.45)
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once −0.15 (0.04) −0.25 (0.08) −0.23 (0.17)
Twice −0.17 (0.05) −0.03 (0.23) −0.24 (0.17)
Thrice or more −0.03 (0.09) 0.01 (0.26) −0.14 (0.18)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months −0.55 (0.12) −0.03 (0.07) −0.72 (0.26)
6-8 months −0.12 (0.08) −0.08 (0.16) −0.56 (0.53)
9-11 months −0.00 (0.07) −0.08 (0.16) −1.01 (1.23)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI 0.02 (0.02) −0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.27)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy −0.00 (0.02) −0.00 (0.04) −0.06 (0.14)
Interviewer
Same interviewer −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.04) 0.07 (0.24)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.06)
Sept. to Nov. 0.03 (0.03) −0.04 (0.02) 0.00 (0.19)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) −0.15 (0.22)
3rd −0.03 (0.09) 0.01 (0.04) −0.21 (0.19)
4th −0.06 (0.13) 0.00 (0.06) −0.27 (0.23)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Num. obs. 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.82 0.88 0.84
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.59 0.75 0.38
Notes: This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with positive and negative logarithmic
differences as dependent variable (i.e. negative values correspond to under-reporting and positive values to
over-reporting). Cluster robust standard errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect
models relies on sufficiently large with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth
have been removed from the baseline specification. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Table B.7: Full panel regression results – Learning effect – Log differences
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 1.03 (0.13) 0.38 (0.13) 0.59 (0.47)
2. Decile 0.54 (0.05) 0.12 (0.07) 0.16 (0.14)
3. Decile 0.24 (0.03) 0.03 (0.05) −0.09 (0.11)
4. Decile 0.12 (0.03) −0.00 (0.03) 0.08 (0.14)
6. Decile −0.06 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) −0.09 (0.15)
7. Decile −0.08 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) −0.17 (0.12)
8. Decile −0.07 (0.04) −0.01 (0.05) −0.09 (0.12)
9. Decile −0.07 (0.04) −0.05 (0.05) −0.22 (0.09)
10. Decile −0.06 (0.06) 0.04 (0.04) −0.24 (0.09)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Age 0.08 (0.05) 0.04 (0.09) 0.06 (0.16)
Age2 −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad −0.00 (0.11) 0.02 (0.02) 0.13 (0.14)
Fair 0.00 (0.09) 0.01 (0.03) 0.06 (0.20)
Good −0.02 (0.08) 0.02 (0.03) 0.15 (0.19)
Very good −0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.02) 0.11 (0.20)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 −0.03 (0.06) 0.28 (0.20) −0.26 (0.18)
>100 000 inhabitants −0.05 (0.08) 0.02 (0.13) −0.07 (0.45)
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once −0.02 (0.04) 0.09 (0.03) 0.02 (0.15)
Twice −0.03 (0.04) 0.09 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18)
Thrice or more −0.01 (0.11) −0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.20)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months −0.12 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) −0.32 (0.44)
6-8 months 0.01 (0.05) −0.32 (0.26) −0.56 (0.53)
9-11 months 0.04 (0.04) −0.40 (0.15) 0.33 (0.81)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI −0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.07 (0.10)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy −0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.10 (0.04)
Interviewer
Same interviewer −0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.04) 0.06 (0.10)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.00 (0.04)
Sept. to Nov. 0.01 (0.03) 0.07 (0.03) 0.02 (0.13)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −0.07 (0.04) −0.08 (0.03) −0.09 (0.08)
3rd −0.12 (0.08) −0.15 (0.04) −0.13 (0.17)
4th −0.17 (0.12) −0.19 (0.05) −0.20 (0.21)
Other controls
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Num. obs. 20372 10105 2470
R2 (full model) 0.81 0.88 0.81
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.56 0.74 0.29
Notes: This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions with absolute logarithmic differences
as dependent variable (i.e. negative values (under-reporting) have been multiplied by −1). Cluster robust
standard errors are given in parentheses. As identification in fixed effect models relies on sufficiently large
with-in variation, the variables gender, education and country of birth have been removed from the baseline
specification.Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
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Table B.8: Decomposition of explained variance – SILC 2008-2011
Wages Pensions Unempl. Benefits
Proportion of variance explained 5.9 13.3 49.2
Relative importance:
(i) Social desirability 69.5 75.0 22.5
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics 28.9 21.8 67.7
(iii) Survey setting 0.8 2.9 6.2
(iv) Learning effect 0.7 0.3 3.6
Notes: This table shows the goodness-of-fit of OLS regressions and its decomposition to
four error sources, i.e. four groups of explanatory variables. We quantify the relative
importance of (i) social desirability, (ii) socio-demographic characteristics, (iii) aspects of
the survey design, and (iv) learning effects on the basis of separate regressions for wages,
pensions and unemployment benefits. Absolute Reporting errors are regressed on the same
set of explanatory variables that were used before (see section 3), using all available
pooled cross-sections. Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations.
Table B.9: Changes of Income Deciles (Income Mobility)
Deciles Wages Pension Unemployment
changed % Obs % Obs % Obs
0 62.1 5478 74.8 3492 23.2 148
1 27.2 2402 18.2 849 31.1 199
2 6.0 528 2.8 132 18.5 118
3 2.3 207 1.6 74 11.1 71
4 1.2 104 1.0 46 7.2 46
5 0.6 57 1.0 45 3.8 24
6 0.4 32 0.2 9 3.1 20
7 0.1 11 0.2 8 1.4 9
8 0.1 7 0.2 10 0.6 4
9 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.0 0
B.1 Misreporting and attenuation bias in linear models
Quantifying the attenuation bias due to misreporting gives data users and practitioners some guid-
ance on the expected bias when they use income data from SILC in their own regression models
(or see it being used in existing publications). Second, it allows for a comparison of the magnitude
of attenuation bias in the Austrian SILC with similar quantifications for other countries and in
particular with Bingley and Martinello (2017) (table 1 & table 2, column 1).
To show how the error model translates into attenuation bias, we have replicated table 2, col. 1
of Bingley and Martinello (2017) for our data and for all income variables. Thus, we estimated rho
(i.e. the coefficient indicating mean reversion if negative and significant) under the assumption that
the administrative data are error-free. Based on that we calculated various measures for attenuation
bias resulting from the error model.
See equation 1 in Bingley and Martinello (2017): ”We are interested in estimating the relation-
ship between a dependent variable y and an explanatory variable x. However, we observe not one
or both variables in the model, but a measure ms”
ms = κs+ρ(m+µm)+ εs
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where m∈{y,x} and the subscript s indicates that we are validating survey information; thus ms is
the measure observed in the survey data. According to this formulation, measurement error consists
of three components: κ is a constant representing a nonzero mean error; εs is in iid distributed
error term with mean zero and constant variance σ2s and ρs represents the dependence between
measurement error and the quantity of interest. Ultimately, for a quantification of bias in different
settings, we are interesting in estimating ρs. Under the assumption of classical measurement error in
the survey data, ρs = κs = 0. In this case measurement error ms−m has mean zero and is independent
of the quantity of interests.
We base our assessment of the size of the bias on a regression of the measurement error (defined
as ms−m, where ms is the log of income according to the survey and m is the log if income according
to the registers) on m. The residual variance of that model is σs, the variance of m is given by
σx and ρs is the slope coefficient. Using this notation, the estimate bias in OLS estimators due to
measurement error in the explanatory variables is given by
bias OLS= (1+ρs)σ
2
x
(1+ρs)2σ2s
For IV models, the bias is given by
1
1+ρs
and the bias resulting from measurement error on the left hand side variable is given by
1+ρs
As the following table shows, we find a negative correlation (mean reversion), significantly
different from zero, between measurement error in all 3 income types and its register value. The
effect is stronger than in Bingley and Martinello (2017) and in the classical studies of Bound and
Krueger (1991) and Bound, Brown, Duncan, et al. (1994). However, direct comparisons have to be
treated with caution as the exact definition of ‘income’ varies between studies.
This apparent nonclassicality e.g. suggests that all results estimating returns (e.g. of educa-
tion) on wages are biased (LHS bias) and are underestimated by about 25%, whereas Bingley and
Martinello (2017) observe a bias of only 10%. If error-prone pension income is used as dependent
variable this bias increases to 35%
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Table B.10: Replication of Bingley/Martinello (2017), table 2 col. 1 based on SILC
Bingley (2017) SILC
1 2 3 4
Log(Income) Gross total income Wages Pensions Unemp. Benefits
ρs -.103** -.256*** -0.355*** -0.283***
(.0375) (.0082) (0.0201) (0.0201)
OLS bias .479 .905 .931 .741
IV bias 1.115 1.344 1.550 1.394
LHS bias .897 .744 .645 .717
N 1649 23372 10850 2794
** p<.05; *** p<0.001 Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. OLS estimates. Columns (2) to (4)
based on pooled cross-sections 2008-2011. (1): To account for classification conventions in the Danish Tax
system and to increase sample size, Bingley and Martinello (2017) use gross income defined as the sum of
both wages and pensions.
C Robustness checks
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Table C.1: Results: Linear Probability Model for Mismatch Groups
Dependent variable:
Wages Unemp. Pensions
S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A
(i) Social desirability
Relative income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile −0.38∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.04 0.32∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2. Decile −0.19∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.02 0.16∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
3. Decile −0.11∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.06∗∗ 0.07 −0.04∗∗ −0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
4. Decile −0.02 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.06∗∗ 0.06 0.01 −0.04∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
6. Decile 0.09∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.01 −0.12∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
7. Decile 0.15∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗ −0.01 −0.08∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
8. Deilce 0.19∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
9. Decile 0.28∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
10. Decile 0.42∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender (Ref: Female)
Male −0.11∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.02 0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age
Age −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.02 0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (Ref: Compulsory)
Upper secondary −0.08∗∗∗ −0.00 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.00 −0.04 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-secondary −0.09∗∗∗ −0.01 0.10∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.00 0.06 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1st stage tertiary −0.11∗∗∗ 0.00 0.11∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.06∗∗ 0.03 −0.05 −0.00 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
2nd stage tertiary −0.04 −0.05∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.08 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Country of birth (Ref: AUT)
EU15 −0.04 0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CEE −0.03 0.00 0.02 0.11 −0.08∗ −0.03 0.00 −0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Yugosphere 0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.01 0.05 −0.07 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Turkey 0.07∗∗ −0.01 −0.06∗∗ −0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09)
Other 0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.03 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad −0.05 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01 −0.10 −0.02 0.05∗ −0.03
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Fair −0.04 −0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 −0.08 −0.02 0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Good −0.08 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.03 −0.09 −0.04∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Very Good −0.13∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗ 0.04 0.06 −0.10 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 −0.02 0.02∗ −0.00 −0.04 0.01 0.03 −0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
>100 000 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.03 0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table continues on next page
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Dependent variable:
Wages Unemp. Pensions
S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A
Table C.1 cont.
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once 0.04∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.01 0.10∗∗ −0.04 −0.05 0.30∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.08∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Twice 0.05∗∗ 0.00 −0.05∗∗ 0.10∗∗ −0.05 −0.05 0.25∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07)
Thrice or More −0.03 −0.05∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.14∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.07 0.22 −0.10 −0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 moths)
<6 0.29∗∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.26∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.42∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.06∗∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
6-8 0.11∗∗∗ −0.05∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.02 −0.16∗∗∗ −0.11 0.02 0.09
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
9-11 0.03 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.09 0.02 −0.12∗ 0.05 −0.10 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI −0.02 0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.05 0.06∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.03∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Interviewer
Same interviewer 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.08∗ 0.06∗ 0.02 −0.00 0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.04∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 0.02∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.03∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sept. to Nov. 0.02 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 0.10∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Year of interview (Ref: 2008)
2009 −0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.04 0.00 −0.03∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2010 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 0.02 0.03 −0.06∗ 0.03∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2011 −0.01 −0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.30∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07∗ −0.05∗ −0.02 0.03 −0.04∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
3rd −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 −0.05∗ 0.01 0.02 −0.05∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
4th −0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 −0.01 −0.03 0.02 −0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.68∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.91∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ −2.28∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.12) (0.18) (0.35) (0.41) (0.35)
Observations 20,365 20,365 20,365 2,467 2,467 2,467 10,104 10,104 10,104
Log Likelihood -14,612.23 -12,427.26 -12,729.54 -1,693.76 -948.46 -1,697.32 -5,781.48 -6,271.54 -4,293.09
Akaike Inf. Crit. 29,314.45 24,944.52 25,549.09 3,477.52 1,986.93 3,484.64 11,652.96 12,633.08 8,676.18
This tables shows the marginal effects from linear probability models estimated for each mismatch category (S<A: survey
reported income is below the value in the administrative database; S=A: survey reported income corresponds to administra-
tive database within a bandwidth of ± 5%; S>A: survey reported income is above the value in the administrative data) per
income type (wages, pensions and unemployment benefits). The respective dependent variable corresponding to columns
(2) to (9) is a binary indicator, equal to one if the mismatch type is observed for the corresponding income type and zero
otherwise. Standard errors based on 500 bootstrap replicates are reported in parenthesis.
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Table C.2: Results: Linear Probability Model for Mismatch Groups- Exclusive of Income Deciles
Dependent variable:
Wages Unemp. Pensions
S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender (Ref: Male)
Male −0.01 −0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age
Age 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.00 −0.01∗ −0.01 0.09∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 −0.00 −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (Ref: Compulsory)
Upper secondary −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05∗ 0.00 −0.05∗ −0.01 0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post secondary 0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1st stage tertiary 0.04∗∗ −0.00 −0.04∗∗ 0.08∗ −0.04 −0.04 0.07∗∗ −0.06∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
2nd stage tertiary 0.19∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.06 0.08 −0.03 0.13∗∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Country of birth (Ref: AUT)
EU15 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.05∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
CEE −0.11∗∗∗ 0.00 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.08∗ −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Yugosphere −0.00 −0.04∗ 0.04∗ 0.07∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.01 0.01 −0.06 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Turkey 0.03 0.00 −0.03 −0.05 −0.00 0.05 −0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
Other −0.01 −0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.02 −0.02 0.04 −0.07 0.05 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad −0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.10 0.01 −0.10 −0.03 0.05∗∗ −0.03
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Fair 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.05 −0.06 −0.03∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Good −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 −0.07 −0.03 0.09∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Very Good −0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 −0.09 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: <10 000 inhabitants)
>10 000 & <100 000 −0.00 0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.04 0.02 0.02 −0.02 0.03∗∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
> 100000 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗ −0.03∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Changes in employment status(Ref: None)
Once 0.05∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.02 0.09∗∗ −0.06∗ −0.04 0.23∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Twice 0.06∗∗ 0.00 −0.06∗∗ 0.09∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.02 0.18 −0.26∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08)
Thrice or More −0.03 −0.06∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.08 0.18 −0.08 −0.10
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13)
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 0.01 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.22∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.07∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
6-8 −0.05∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09 0.01 −0.10 −0.06 −0.01 0.07
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
9-11 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08 0.03 −0.11∗ 0.16∗ −0.15∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Table continues on next page
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Dependent variable:
Wages Unemp. Pensions
S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A S< A S= A S> A
Table C.2 cont.
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI
CATI −0.01 0.03∗∗ −0.02 −0.04 0.07∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 0.03 −0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Interviewer
Same Interviewer 0.00 0.01 −0.02 −0.07∗ 0.06∗ 0.02 0.00 0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 0.02 0.03∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Months of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 0.02∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 −0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sept. to Nov. 0.02 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.09∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year of interview (Ref: 2008)
2009 0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.05 0.00 −0.02∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
2010 0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.02 0.03 −0.05 0.03∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2011 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.30∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 −0.05∗ −0.01 0.02 −0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
3rd −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 −0.05∗ 0.01 0.01 −0.04∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
4th −0.03∗ 0.02 0.01 0.04 −0.01 −0.03 0.01 −0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.28∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ −0.07 0.04 1.03∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗ −2.57∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.39) (0.41) (0.35)
Observations 20,366 20,366 20,366 2,468 2,468 2,468 10,105 10,105 10,105
Log Likelihood -15,389.93 -12,559.88 -13,810.54 -1,779.31 -968.37 -1,833.13 -6,015.67 -6,335.31 -4,560.57
Akaike Inf. Crit. 30,851.86 25,191.76 27,693.08 3,630.61 2,008.75 3,738.26 12,103.33 12,742.63 9,193.13
This tables shows the marginal effects from linear probability models estimated for each mismatch category (S<A: survey
reported income is below the value in the administrative database; S=A: survey reported income corresponds to administra-
tive database within a bandwidth of ± 5%; S>A: survey reported income is above the value in the administrative data) per
income type (wages, pensions and unemployment benefits). The respective dependent variable corresponding to columns
(2) to (9) is a binary indicator, equal to one if the mismatch type is observed for the corresponding income type and zero
otherwise. Standard errors based on 500 bootstrap replicates are reported in parenthesis. In contrasted to the original
specification corresponding to table 5 in the paper and table C.1 in the appendix, income deciles are not included in this
specification.
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Table C.3: Multinomial logit regressions: p-values (see table 5)
Wages Pensions Unemp. benefits
S<A S=A S>A S<A S=A S>A S<A S=A S>A
(i) Social desirability
Realtive income (Ref: 5. Decile)
1. Decile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.000
2. Decile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.031 0.000 0.005 0.315 0.001
3. Decile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.529 0.006 0.951 0.017 0.140
4. Decile 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.057 0.129 0.795 0.021 0.123
6. Decile 0.000 0.648 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.254 0.010 0.567 0.008
7. Decile 0.000 0.459 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.752 0.018 0.869 0.051
8. Decile 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.753 0.000
9. Decile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.042 0.000
10. Decile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.096 0.000
(ii) Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender (Ref: Female)
Male 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.522 0.000 0.030 0.187 0.001
Age
Age 0.584 0.690 0.810 0.101 0.914 0.051 0.032 0.001 0.874
Education (Ref: Compulsory)
1st stage tertiary 0.000 0.422 0.000 0.133 0.883 0.094 0.626 0.061 0.534
Post-secondary 0.000 0.879 0.000 0.003 0.199 0.035 0.299 0.887 0.343
2nd stage tertiary 0.239 0.173 0.015 0.767 0.687 0.530 0.617 0.594 0.993
Upper secondary 0.000 0.545 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.009 0.095 0.836 0.140
Country of birth (Ref: AUT)
EU10 0.355 0.867 0.385 0.900 0.669 0.696 0.086 0.087 0.614
EU15 0.068 0.877 0.097 0.357 0.003 0.000 0.945 0.880 0.960
other 0.001 0.004 0.183 0.983 0.730 0.698 0.774 0.838 0.620
Turkey 0.046 0.696 0.071 0.570 0.936 0.665 0.326 0.912 0.304
Yugosphere 0.008 0.003 0.975 0.265 0.111 0.751 0.040 0.020 0.809
Health status (Ref: Very bad)
Bad 0.420 0.657 0.615 0.304 0.014 0.162 0.152 0.903 0.111
Fair 0.497 0.985 0.410 0.260 0.001 0.021 0.694 0.165 0.260
Good 0.179 0.737 0.212 0.083 0.000 0.012 0.308 0.594 0.204
Very good 0.033 0.724 0.029 0.001 0.000 0.407 0.436 0.151 0.119
Degree of urbanisation (Ref: < 10 000 inhabitants)
<10 000 inhabitants 0.216 0.044 0.631 0.011 0.022 0.683 0.222 0.442 0.502
>100 000 inhabitants 0.000 0.107 0.005 0.000 0.017 0.169 0.000 0.084 0.038
Changes in employment status (Ref: None)
Once 0.030 0.029 0.912 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.095 0.074 0.525
Thrice or more 0.858 0.060 0.032 0.407 0.586 0.597 0.012 0.017 0.358
Twice 0.050 0.777 0.054 0.005 0.000 0.833 0.060 0.047 0.556
Months in corresponding employment status (Ref: 12 months)
<6 months 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.014 0.224 0.000 0.178 0.000
6-8 months 0.000 0.023 0.009 0.209 0.833 0.344 0.000 0.343 0.000
9-11 months 0.166 0.001 0.204 0.639 0.219 0.342 0.047 0.338 0.027
(iii) Survey setting
Mode of interview (Ref: CAPI)
CATI 0.139 0.005 0.577 0.166 0.105 0.656 0.085 0.026 0.585
Interviewer
Same interviewer 0.603 0.430 0.139 0.960 0.382 0.296 0.043 0.067 0.716
Type of interview (Ref: Personal)
Proxy 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.015 0.000 0.143 0.927 0.765 0.882
Month of interview (Ref: March to May)
June to Aug. 0.006 0.000 0.471 0.246 0.046 0.224 0.926 0.922 0.986
Sept. to Nov. 0.226 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.611 0.961 0.857 0.865
Year of interview (Ref: 2008)
2009 0.872 0.366 0.353 0.860 0.057 0.061 0.481 0.413 0.260
2010 0.670 0.906 0.569 0.060 0.014 0.444 0.517 0.119 0.094
2011 0.603 0.860 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.777 0.590 0.519
(iv) Learning effect
Wave of interview (Ref: 1st)
2nd 0.295 0.736 0.393 0.030 0.077 0.946 0.043 0.059 0.661
3rd 0.209 0.516 0.417 0.243 0.019 0.103 0.253 0.040 0.644
4th 0.069 0.103 0.600 0.199 0.242 0.885 0.339 0.621 0.581
Source: SILC 2008-2011, own calculations. This table shows the estimated average marginal effects of multinomial regressions per income
type (wages, pensions and unemployment benefits) in three categories: (1) S<A: reported income is below the value in administrative data (2)
S=A: survey income corresponds to administrative data. (3) S>A: reported income is above the value in administrative data. Estimates with an
associated p–value below 0.01 are depicted in bold, values below 0.05 in italics. Insignificant estimates (p–value above 0.05) are given in gray.
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